THE NEW REPUBLIC

Cuba

A Dissenting Report

September 12, 1960, 25 cents

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T.R.B. *from Washington*

The Religious Issue

★ In the European political definition of the phrase, Kennedy is an "anti-clerical." This does not mean that he is not a good Catholic; he is a Catholic who believes in the separation of Church and State, or as the dictionary puts it, one who would soft-pedal "the influence of the Roman Catholic clergy in public affairs." Reporters have seen instances of this and it's on the record. On all the trick questions – birth control, parochial school aid, personal conscience – Kennedy has given a categorical reply. This reporter recalls one incident on a rainy evening last May, in a political rally at Portland University (Oregon), a Catholic college. Answering a heckler on his religion, Kennedy firmly declared that the Pope would never try (and in any event could not if he did) to come between him and his Constitutional oath for separation of Church and State, which, he reminded his questioner, he would take on a Bible to God. The undergraduates cheered this impressive reply which made all the more conspicuous the silence of a group of nuns in the audience and the bank of faculty priests on the platform, who probably didn't want to get out on such dangerous ground. American voters have a right to vote for, or against, Kennedy for his religion, but it might be wise to understand the distinctions in the matter.

The Hopeful Side

★ This column often seems carping and lugubrious because we try to point out things that our contemporaries omit. By nature, however, we are as cheerful as can be, and always wish we had more space for the hopeful items. Here are two, for example: We think it is gratifying and perfectly astounding the way the drive for medical aid for the aged has suddenly blossomed. It happened all of a moment, out of nowhere. We haven't a doubt that it will succeed before long, that it will ultimately be tied in to Social Security, and that a system of national health insurance for everybody will follow.

A second thing that is enormously hopeful, we think, is the way the Negroes in the South are cracking social barriers – not by leadership of the Whites but for the first time by their own efforts. A Supreme Court decision in Washington is one thing; a successful sit-down strike in a local Woolworth's is another. Negroes have never had self-confidence; they came as slaves and remained as serfs. Now for the first time they are developing their own leaders, their own heroes and alas, their own martyrs. They can throw back their shoulders in pride at some of these brave boys and girls in integrated schools. Here is a movement that can't be stopped either.

Squandered Assets

★ The inglorious 86th Congress has departed – the last one Eisenhower will ever face. Happy liberals thought it ushered in a new era when it met in January, 1959, after a 2-to-1 midterm election victory. But rarely have political assets been so squandered. Right at the start Lyndon Johnson blocked liberal efforts to reform the Senate rules and Speaker Rayburn broke up a parallel move in the House to curb the arrogant Rules Committee by going personal bond for its good behavior.

What Eisenhower did was to raise the inflation bogey. He and his economic advisers delayed strong counter-recession steps in the 1958 slump and consequently ended up in June 30, 1959 with the biggest deficit in US peacetime history: $12.4 billions! Having achieved this unique deficit himself he proceeded to warn Democrats that any social reforms they proposed would deepen the fiscal hole and bankrupt the country. Messrs. Johnson and Rayburn, under the tutelage of fellow-Texan Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, walked into the snare amidst a perfectly stupendous anti-inflation barrage by the press; Johnson promised to be "responsible" in an evident approach to Los Angeles.

Well, we know what happened. Rayburn could not control the Rules Committee, the social reforms postponed till after the Los Angeles convention could not be passed, the Democratic candidates were made to look rather silly, and Eisenhower rewarded the cooperative Congress by kicking it around. On top of that it has been one of the dullest Congresses we can remember.

The Gallup poll now says that Nixon isn't ahead after all, Dick and Jack are neck and neck. We repeat what we wrote before, don't trust the polls at this time! It's just too early. We don't know who will win. Wait till after the first Nixon-Kennedy TV appearance.

Southern conservatives are quietly working for Kennedy's defeat; they want the party to lose. They are personally entrenched in one-party states and will be returned anyway. A Republican victory would knock off some of the Democrats in the North who are gaining competitive seniority for the Southerners' chairmanships. From the Dixiecrats' viewpoint a Nixon victory would be ideal; it would leave Eastland and Byrd and Judge Howard Smith in control of the committees (providing the Democrats hold Congress, which seems likely) with a conservative in the White House with whom they could deal.

In Spite of Everything

★ After eight years of playing hot and cold on school aid with Congress, Eisenhower's sorry record is complete. In spite of Sputnik, in spite of everything as he leaves office, the USA is only devoting half as much of its national product to education as the USSR is. Put another way, a competitor with half our wealth is spending as much for schools and training as we are. Put another way, if we spent the proportion for schools that our most deadly enemy now spends, we would be spending twice as much.

The University of Michigan Institute of Public Affairs has just published "The President Makes a Decision: A Study of Dixon-Yates," by Jason L. Finkle. The scandal arose, the author says, because Eisenhower delegated details to a "team" which didn't tell him what was going on. A better title would be "How the Budget Bureau Fooled a Golfing President."

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While We Campaign

Those acrimonious closing days of the special Congressional session, so long on political frustration for candidate John F. Kennedy and so short on legislative accomplishment, were also days in which the Soviet Union quietly increased its credits for the coming Indian Third Five Year Plan from $375 to $500 million and more than trebled its commitment to finance the Aswan Dam with a second-stage loan pledge of $225 million on top of an earlier $100 million. The Soviet timing no doubt reflects a sensitivity to the domestic politics of India and Egypt, not the United States; but no moment could have been deliberately chosen, as it happens, when the United States would be found in a more defenseless posture for economic sparring with the Russians. No one in the expiring Administration, not even Undersecretary Douglas Dillon, who knows better, was in a mood to make a big issue of foreign economic aid in the almost neurotic partisan confusion of the special session. And a Democratic leadership which could get nowhere on minimum wage and medical care legislation backed by big domestic voting blocs not surprisingly failed to do better against the Southern Democratic-GOP coalition on an issue with no special interest support at all.

What happened on aid in the special session, or rather did not happen, has a particular and immediate bearing on the US role in India. With no desperate crisis this year comparable to the foreign exchange deficit of 1958, India has offered little headline competition to Cuba or the Congo, let alone to Nixon versus Kennedy. But the Indians are passing through a phase with quite as much watershed significance in their national life as the change of Administration in ours. The advent of the Third Five Year Plan in April finds the Nehru Government less sure of its ground than at any time since Independence: multiplying internal problems, plus continuing unease over Chinese border intentions, have awakened new doubts concerning the Prime Minister's infallibility on the part of the politically potent middle class which has, in the past, given him more or less uncritical support. This gradual erosion of confidence in the national leadership leaves the future increasingly uncertain and gives to the Third Plan a special importance. For if the Plan's prospects begin to seem wobbly, then despond and political instability might well spread too far and too fast for one of our characteristic, after-the-fact rescue operations to do much good.

Quite apart from the $4.6 billion total in foreign exchange needed

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over the full span of the Third Plan, the Indians now need, and it has been no secret that they would need, $900 million to get the Plan started on time. That is, orders totalling that amount must be placed over the next six months for Plan projects to start remotely on schedule. Here the Russians with $300 million of their credits even now ready for the drawing are in a position to be of help at the very time our Development Loan Fund remains so underfinanced as to make an adequate US response next to impossible. Although Congress last year authorized $1.1 billion to be appropriated in the just-ended session, the Administration asked only $700 million, and this was whittled down, predictably, to $550 million last week. Senator Kennedy made an effort to keep the full $700 million, but any chance of success he might have had was undercut when Undersecretary Dillon told the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 27 that the restoration of $65 million in defense support for our military allies, among other things, was the main absolute "must" in the aid bill and one that took clear precedence over the DLF. He suggested that DLF needs be met with a supplementary appropriation in January, offering the technical explanation that, whereas the DLF does not disburse funds in tandem with annual Congressional appropriations, drawing, instead, on its total accumulation of funds, military aid is programmed to coincide with yearly aid budgets. This argument is valid enough in its own bureaucratic terms, but it is a striking example of the disorder in priorities which has characterized this Administration in aid policy.

Mr. Dillon has his $65 million in defense support. For this he has written off, however, the possibility of vigorous US participation in the five-nation Western consortium meeting on India in Paris beginning September 12 under World Bank sponsorship. As DLF ledgers now stand, the total Western response to New Delhi at Paris is hardly likely to reach $300 million – much of it not immediately available – spotlighting the Soviets, with *their* ready $300 million, as Johnny-on-the-spot, and leaving another $300 million shortfall in initial Plan projects. On the basis of past practice, the DLF may not put forward much more than, say, $140 million (of its new $550 million); the DLF has been allocating to India roughly 25 percent of its loans, though Senator Kennedy has urged that the share go up to 40 percent in view of India's proportionate population within the non-Communist underdeveloped world, not to mention its administrative machine and overall absorptive capacity. Moreover, the ability of the DLF to stress India will diminish in the coming months as pressures for loans to Latin America grow. The new Inter-American Bank will not have more than $50 million in soft loan capital available until late next year, so that the Administration, to carry forward the plan for interim Latin American aid now being advertised at the Bogotá meeting of economic ministers, might necessarily turn to the DLF. Although the new Bank was established with a frank 2-1 emphasis on hard loans, the interim plan accents certain fields of activity, notably land reform and housing, which imply soft currency repayments and thus the use of the DLF. The Board of Governors of the Bank has only recently been appointed and the members are, quite literally, barely settled at their desks. There are, in any case, a whole host of procedural details to be worked out before the Bank will be in business: the machinery for processing applications is yet to be evolved, and the contributions from many member states are yet to come.

Latin American aid should obviously have a central place in our foreign economic policy. The prospects for Cuba discussed by Samuel Shapiro in this issue underscore this patent truth, just as they suggest that some of the political assumptions underlying present US aid policy in Latin America need updating. But Latin American aid should not be a makeshift response to the latest headlines and should certainly not be at the expense of other crucial regions which can all too easily become the locale of tomorrow's headlines.

Khrushchev in New York

Nikita Khrushchev has announced that he will lead the Soviet delegation to the impending session of the General Assembly. Leaders of other countries within the Soviet orbit eligible to attend by reason of membership in the United Nations will be there. They will come as a bloc and operate as a bloc, with a program well contrived to grab initiatives from the United States and its Western allies. President Eisenhower described the Khrushchev foray into New York as "a propaganda thing." So it may be, but to say this is not to discount its significance. It is as if a crew of our would-be undertakers were coming over for a little grave-digging practice in our backyard.

The opportunity for making propaganda on the American domestic scene while we go about our election year preoccupations is large and sinister. Khrushchev will be right here at the central points of the country's communication system. He can say what he wishes to an unlimited audience, and yet enjoy the immunity of diplomatic status. He can gad about New York, projecting his world views and his personality – which is prodigious, however unlovable it may be – among the newcomers who will be there in large numbers representing the dozen or so African states on whose certificates of sovereignty and independence the ink is scarcely dry. Among them may be Lumumba, ready to give lessons in how to put a ring in the nose of international authority. It will be impossible to ig-

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nore such goings-on. The rival presidential candidates will be under great pressure to compete in rhetorical responses that can only be harmful and diversionary to a rational consideration of issues.

At the time of the original decision to locate the United Nations in New York, the conception of the UN as a medium of collaboration, something standing apart from the competition of a cold war still to come, was scarcely questioned. Indeed, this was implicit in the very title of the then new organization. It stood for unity. The words said so – an act of unconscious genius in selecting a name. Suppose it had been called at the outset the Assorted Nations. How different the image would have been. Anyway, we have its physical presence within our own land, and our opponents can contrive to use it for their purposes as they may within the limits of their right to come and go and say their say, irrespective of the impact on us domestically. We shall be hearing more about this from those quarters which have never accepted the United Nations or our membership in it. We do not rejoice over the prospect, but there it is.

Hope for the Aged

As TRB notes in this issue, the fiasco on medical care for the aged in the special session of Congress does have within it a ray of hope for the future. The issue has at least been raised to high prominence and this year's token program will hardly still the political clamor for more and better action. It so happens that the present plan is going to cost the states some money; when the states begin to implement this program, they are going to cast longing eyes at the Social Security approach. A Kennedy victory should insure adoption of his plan or something similar by 1962, and even a Nixon victory does not entirely preclude such action.

Professor Wilbur J. Cohen of the University of Michigan, a Kennedy adviser on Social Security matters, thinks it highly likely that the next Administration, Democratic or Republican, will not only push through a broadened medical care for the aged plan, but may also bring about some overdue related improvements in unemployment insurance. He has cited the fact in recent interviews that there is already about $7 billion in unemployment compensation reserves to finance the increases (though state-administered, unemployment compensation is supervised from Washington by the Social Security Administration and financed through a matching formula of federal and state funds). He also sees the possibility of changing existing legislation so that the temporarily sick or disabled – those unable to work for a few months – can also be paid benefits.

As for Social Security's long-term future, the system has come so far in its recently-commemorated first 25 years that there simply isn't as far to go in the next 25. But one can look to the continuing upward revision of the maximum limits on outside earnings beyond which benefits cannot be collected. The widow now eligible for only 75 percent of her late husband's benefits may eventually be permitted to collect 100 percent. The present $4,800 maximum in yearly earnings against which Social Security payroll taxes are collected may well be at least doubled before many years, permitting correspondingly higher retirement benefits for middle-income groups. And there might even be a general increase in all Social Security benefits averaging about 40 to 50 percent above present levels.

The I.Q. Meter

Those who doubt the wonders of California may retire. At Whittier College, Professor Albert Upton has just finished giving a course in "analytic thinking" which raised his freshmen students' average score on IQ tests from 110 last September to 120 this June.

For parents worried about getting their children into college this will have immediate implications. The difference between an IQ of 110 and 120 is the difference between outscoring nine people out of ten instead of seven out of ten. Or, in more practical social terms, it is the difference between getting into Stanford instead of Whittier. Alert parents are therefore likely to begin putting pressure on local high schools to add an "Upton Course" which will prepare college-bound students for increasingly crucial "scholastic aptitude" tests.

If this happens – and it is hard to see why it won't – both colleges and the public may have to think some more about what IQ tests really measure. Despite the *caveats* of professional psychologists, both parents and educators have lived for many years by the fiction that such tests somehow measured the size of the "knowledge bucket." When a first grade teacher told a proud parent that little Johnny had an IQ of only 85, both tended to feel that he had an irremediable biological deficiency and was doomed to a career as a truck driver.

Dr. Upton's experiment underlines the view of most professional psychologists that intelligence is like sex appeal, and looks "natural" only to those who lack it. In order to mean anything, "intelligence" must be taken to refer not to some innate physical capacity. but to the painfully acquired ability to solve particular problems. Thus any test of overall intelligence would have to evaluate a man's ability to solve all kinds of problems within the range of human experience. Although an IQ test makes no such claim, laymen who employ test scores often assume it does, disregarding warnings that the ability to solve short abstract problems under pressure is but one facet of "intelligence."

The most obvious limitation on an IQ test is that it

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measures only ability to solve symbolic problems posed in words, numbers, or pictures. Of course many of man's problems are symbolic, and the ability to manipulate words, and to a lesser extent numbers, is of growing importance in coping with modern life. But many other problems derive directly from human experience and require no symbolic analysis. Certainly the majority of human problems are difficult because it is hard to translate reality into symbols, rather than because it is difficult to manipulate these symbols. It hardly makes sense to call a man "intelligent" if he cannot solve moral or social problems. Yet every day colleges which claim to be "training the leaders of tomorrow" select their prospective elite on the basis of a minimal IQ test score.

Even if one does define intelligence as the ability to solve "abstract" rather than "real" problems, there are serious difficulties with using the IQ test as a yardstick. Essentially an IQ test does not pose intellectual problems but mental puzzles. The important talents of a man who wants to crack the IQ barrier are speed and accuracy, not memory or perspective. If a store wants to know whether a would-be clerk will be able to give a customer buying three apples at six cents and six pears at eight cents the right change for a quarter, four dimes, and a nickel, then an IQ test may be just the thing. But if a law school wants to know whether an applicant will be able to learn in the coming decades to manipulate thousands of items of information, segregate them from equally numerous items of misinformation, interpolate for gaps of ignorance, and then marshall his interpretation into an argument at once morally sound and intellectually convincing – then the series of unrelated 30-second games on an IQ test may not provide much of a clue.

A related difficulty is that if you take an IQ test you are asked only to analyze certain set problems and come up with one "right" answer. You are never asked to synthesize rather than analyze, or to imagine a variety of possibilities rather than to determine one actuality. When researchers at the University of Chicago asked students, for example, to write appropriate endings to unfinished fairy tales, and to see how many math problems they could make up with a given amount of data, they found that the most "creative" students by this yardstick often had unimpressive IQ's, while many whom an IQ test would classify as "genius" turned in stolidly unimaginative performances. And similarly when researchers take a look at the IQ's of highly creative scientists they find that many of these men do worse on IQ tests than their less productive colleagues. Yet it hardly makes sense to say that Nobel Prize winners are therefore less "intelligent" than some men whose only contribution to their profession has been drawing a handsome salary for forty or more years.

Taken together these limitations mean that a man can be socially imperceptive, personally insensitive, and morally obtuse, as well as scatterbrained, shortsighted, and unimaginative, all while being classified as supremely intelligent on the IQ meter. Under such circumstances anyone who relied on an IQ test to discover intellectual potential would be about as silly as a football coach looking for athletic potential who relied on how many pushups every candidate could do.

Yet so long as men have faith in IQ tests, they are bound to "work" in a certain sense, no matter how arbitrary the talents they measure. If a student coming from kindergarten with a low IQ is automatically pushed into a "slow" first grade section (unless his influential parents make a fuss), he will quickly realize that other people think him dull, and will in most cases accept the label and become so. Furthermore, so long as IQ means anything at all, the student in the "slow" section will tend to have "slow" friends, and will become like them, lacking the stimulus of lively associates. Such processes continue throughout school, and by the time a student applies to college he is in a desperate situation if he has not learned to take IQ or "scholastic aptitude" tests. If he is wise he will want to go to a highly selective private college, where bright and enthusiastic students are a majority rather than a minority, and where it will be easier to get an education from fellow students, even if no easier to get one from the faculty. But to get into such a college the student needs, among other things, a first-rate IQ score. Lacking this, even a distinguished high school record is likely to count for little. The overapplied college will either assume that the student did well in school because the school had low standards, or else will assume that he is an "overachiever," whose record testifies to diligence rather than talent.

None of these difficulties is likely to lead to the demise of multiple-choice intelligence indices in the immediate future. Everyone wants to separate the sheep from the goats somehow, and for many purposes IQ tests, whatever their faults, seem to work better than half-hour interviews or inquiries into bank accounts or ancestry. The only solution seems to lie in the direction of better tests which measure a wider range of abilities. Yet so long as tests must take no more than a morning and must be machine-graded, the range of problems presented will inevitably remain narrow.

Congo, Cuba, Costaguana

"The words one knows so well have a nightmarish meaning in this country. Liberty, democracy, patriotism, government – all of them have a flavour of folly and murder." – Charles Gould, in Joseph Conrad's *Nostromo*, on politics in the Republic of Costaguana.

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Off to the Madhouse

Intimations in the public prints toward the fag-end of August that the pollsters were quietly going mad are easy to believe. The business of a pollster is to determine, well in advance of the election, the direction of the political trend. But suppose there is no trend to determine? Why, from the standpoint of a pollster, that way madness lies.

At Greensboro, N.C., (Tarheelia is 99 percent native, 99 percent Protestant and, measured by Congressional representation, 87.5 percent Democratic) Nixon drew an audience of 12,000. In the same week Kennedy, speaking to the North Carolina Press Association, sturdily proclaimed his Catholicism and was wildly applauded. Measure that trend; maybe your psychiatrist can unsnarl you.

So it goes, all over the country. Kennedy leads one poll, Nixon the next. Some pollsters report the undecided at 9 percent; others at 28 percent. Generally speaking 6 percent undecided will make the result unpredictable. Kennedy's religion is a fatal handicap, is his most valuable asset. Nixon's unpopularity dooms him, is non-existent. The evidence proves anything, proves everything, proves nothing. Yes, it is easy to believe that the pollsters are off to the madhouse over the hills to laugh and play with the daffydills.

Nevertheless, to a superficial observer without inside information the situation is logical enough. The campaign has not started yet because nobody has said anything yet. Oh, Mr. Kennedy has published a political confession of faith in *Life* in which he comes out flatly in favor of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and Mr. Nixon is due to publish one which will be a paraphrase of Kennedy's.

The campaign will start when, and not until one candidate or the other faces the vast unreality that overshadows everything else at this moment. That unreality is spending 40 billions a year preparing for a war that isn't going to be fought, while doing relatively little, and nothing effective, to win the war that is already raging, and steadily going against us.

"The only trouble with Warren is that he lacks mentality," Jim Watson said of Candidate Harding in 1920; and that is still the trouble with the Republican administration 40 years later. Sheer lack of mentality in dealing with difficult personalities, from Chiang and Nasser to Castro and Trujillo has reduced the prestige of the United States to a shocking degree; and lack of mentality has prevented realization of the fact that the real war is ideological, not military.

Kennedy's religion and Nixon's popularity status are realities, of a sort, but of the kind that Gibbon derided as having provoked war between the *homoousians* and the *homoiousians* during the disintegration of Rome. If we decide an election on such issues, will it not be evidence of disintegration here, too?

Mr. Kennedy is known with certainty to be an alert and amiable young politician. Mr. Nixon is equally known to be an alert and unamiable young politician. The advantage is with Kennedy, but what a slight advantage! Neither candidate, as far as the public is aware, is firmly committed either for or against these three propositions:

(1) That the American people must be told the truth, and nothing but the truth about all, repeat, *all*, government operations that involve the risk of war.

(2) That the American people must be told the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about all, repeat, *all*, financial operations involving expenditure of tax money.

(3) That no American citizen shall be penalized, molested, or threatened by any government official for the expression of any opinion, no matter how unflattering, on any matter of public business or public policy.

Every one of these propositions has been flagrantly and repeatedly repudiated by the Eisenhower administration and, on occasion, by the Democratic Congress. As a result, American liberty has been seriously impaired at home, and American democracy has been made a hissing and a byword abroad.

Unless and until they are restored in full force and effect we are, and we shall remain to a serious extent disarmed in the ideological war against Communism; and as long as Communism is winning this war it can and will laugh to scorn our vast armament.

Until one candidate or the other convinces the public, first, that he proposes to fight where the enemy is now, not where he was in 1945, and, second, that he knows better than Dulles and Eisenhower knew how to fight ideas with ideas, there will be no campaign, merely a circus. And until there is a campaign, there will be no trend to preserve the sanity of industrious Dr. Gallup and facsimiles thereof.

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ON INFURIATING SOVEREIGNTY

After a month's on-the-spot study during July and August, Samuel Shapiro suggests that Castro's Cuba follows a "leftist-nationalist-neutralist line, basically similar to the positions adopted by Nasser's Egypt and Tito's Yugoslavia – get all you can from the Big Powers, and give them as little as possible in return." Mr. Shapiro, whose comments on Latin American affairs appear regularly in The Economist, *taught as a Fulbright Professor in Argentina in 1959. Now an Assistant Professor of History at Michigan State University (Oakland), where he will join a new Latin American Area Program, he contributes to publications ranging from* American Heritage *to* The Journal of Inter-American Studies. *His report on "this infuriatingly sovereign little island" is frankly pro-Castro and an invitation to the expression of differing views in future issues.*

CUBA

A Dissenting Report

by Samuel Shapiro

As the Cubana Airlines daily plane from New York begins to circle over Havana, people crowd to the portholes to peer down at the city below. Strangers are clapped on the back and told how much they will enjoy "this blessed land." The mood of euphoria continues on the ground. Despite (or because of?) the regime's strident anti-American propaganda, tourists from the North are greeted by a small band, free postal cards that require no stamps, tickets entitling them to free rum drinks, and a polite and perfunctory customs inspection. Although the present government came to power more than a year and a half ago, the dominant mood in the city still resembles that of Paris after the Germans were driven out; to be able to move about the streets without fear of violence or arrest continues to be a matter for rejoicing.

Cuba's ordeal lasted much longer than that of France. For seven years the island was occupied, not by an enemy army, but by the soldiers of Fulgencio Batista, an old-fashioned *caudillo*, but one who understood the refinements of 20th-Century totalitarianism. He kept tight rein on labor unions, the universities and the press. His men murdered thousands of Cubans and tortured or maimed thousands more for loot. The history of this affable little former field hand is the story of contemporary Cuba, and an account of his rise, long rule, and eventual downfall is necessary to any real understanding of Fidel Castro's revolution.

In the summer of 1933, when the regime of Gerardo Machado was stumbling to an end, Batista was a sergeant-stenographer at the Army HQ in Camp Columbia, outside Havana. He took control of the situation by heading a conspiracy of non-coms against their officers; his path to complete power was prepared by Sumner Welles, who persuaded Washington not to grant recognition to the radical regime of Grau San Martín. The hesitant interference of Welles and Cordell Hull in Cuban politics undermined the civilian regime's authority, and resulted in continued fighting and disorder. In a key interview on October 5, Welles told Batista that:

> "in my judgment he was the only individual who represented authority in Cuba. I added that this was owing, in part . . . to the determined and decided action of the troops against Communist and radical elements. That fact . . . had brought to his support the great majority of the commercial and financial interests of Cuba."

For the next 10 years Batista ran the show by a shrewd combination of force, demagogic promises of reform, and solid friendships with American businessmen and diplomats. The old army hierarchy had been eliminated by the time he came to power; every one of the new officers owed him personal allegiance. He re-

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warded them and the enlisted men by pay raises, splendid new uniforms, club-houses, playing fields and generous pensions. Labor was kept in line by the government-controlled Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC), while newspapermen and student leaders were brought around by the distribution of "bottles" (well-paid sinecures). For Cubans on the inside, for American tourists, diplomats, and businessmen, Cuba was a low-cost tropical paradise. As Robert Ruark reminisced in a recent column:

> "Cuba was such a lovely place in the old days—lazy and warm and full of good food, fine drinks, wondrous swimming water, nice people, pretty gals, reasonably honest gambling, and bright night life. All the 'ins' were crooks, or near about, out to steal anything that wasn't white hot, but it was done with grace and was more or less accepted as a prerequisite of the ruling politicos."

Not far from the tourist hotels and the beautiful beaches, however, was another Cuba which few visiting Americans ever saw – the Cuba of the Havana slums, the sugar *centrales*, the mountain regions of Oriente province. This was the Cuba where only one child in three attended school, where some 25 percent of the labor force was permanently unemployed, where hundreds of thousands of families had to live on an income of less than $200 a year, where shoes, toilets, electricity, and even meat, milk, and vegetables were rare luxuries. The Cuban peasant uncomplainingly accepted his lot; the angry young men at the University of Havana had to choose between silence and prison, exile, or execution.

By 1944 Batista had temporarily had enough. He permitted a free election in which Grau San Martin was returned to office in an overwhelming victory, and Batista retired to Miami with a fortune estimated at $40 million. It didn't take Grau long to succumb to temptation; he was indicted by his successor, Carlos Prío Socarrás, for misappropriating $178 million during his administration, but escaped conviction when gunmen stole the pertinent documents before his trial. Prío in turn distinguished himself by building a $2 million home on a salary of $25 thousand a year and by appropriating $20 million in worn-out paper money that had been turned in to be destroyed. The average Cuban accepted corruption as fatalistically as a citizen of Jersey City under Boss Hague. Cuban political life was so thoroughly demoralized that honest men sometimes pretended to be receiving graft, lest they be looked down on as stupid.

But Prío made the mistake of permitting Batista to return to Cuba. The Army's allegiance to the pudgy ex-sergeant had never wavered; and on March 10, 1952, a month before the scheduled elections, Batista brought off his second *coup*. Once again every soldier in the ranks became a privileged being, and every officer's commission a license to steal. Seventeen of Havana's 18 newspapers were on the government payroll. Only a few editors, like Jorge Zayas of *Avance*, were clumsy enough to accept checks. Most of them, along with a number of US newsmen and Florida police chiefs, took cash. Under Eusebio Mujal, the CTC became an efficient damper of labor discontent and a source of additional graft. A number of student leaders at the University (*"el bonche"*) were bought off with "bottles" or funds from *"el baga."* For the discontented the regime kept in reserve Decree Law 997 on Public Order and the brutally persuasive methods of the Military Intelligence Service (SIM).

A Solid Gold Telephone

And there was the firm support Batista got from the United States. American companies controlled 40 percent of the island's sugar lands, 80 percent of its public utilities, 90 percent of the mines and cattle ranches, and, in combination with Shell, substantially all the oil business. American investments in Cuba ran to more than $1 billion, equal to over a third of Cuba's Gross National Product, and Cuba's 6½ million people were our sixth best customer, dependent on us for everything from razor blades to bulldozers. All these interests prospered under the dictatorship, and our diplomacy reflected the State Department's equation of "freedom" with "free enterprise." Arthur Gardner, the American Ambassador in Havana from 1953 to 1957, especially devoted himself to the interests of the Cuban Telephone Company, and managed to secure a big increase in rates. In gratitude the company gave Batista a solid gold telephone and stand (now on display in a Havana museum) and more substantial private tokens of appreciation. Gardner was so effusive in his praise that he embarrassed even the dictator: "I'm glad Ambassador Gardner approves of my government," Batista remarked, "but I wish he wouldn't talk about it so much." A much-published photograph shows the American Ambassador with both arms around the neck of General Francisco Tabernilla, Chief of Staff of Batista's army.

Gardner's successor, Earl E. T. Smith, owed his appointment largely to John Hay Whitney, Republican national campaign treasurer and a large stockholder in Freeport Sulphur. One of the new Ambassador's first acts was to negotiate a substantial tax reduction for Freeport's Cuban subsidiary, the Moa Bay Mining Company. Thereafter Smith accepted all of Batista's promises about civil liberty and free elections at face value, and persistently misinformed Washington about the situation in Cuba.

One of the boldest of the dictator's opponents was a young Havana lawyer, Fidel Castro. A graduate of

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Havana University, Castro had already taken part in an abortive attack on the Trujillo dictatorship of the Dominican Republic in 1947, and the anti-US riots in Bogotá in 1948. A month after Batista's 1952 *coup*, the 26-year-old lawyer submitted a brief declaring the dictator's assumption of power unconstitutional, and demanding prison terms against him totalling 100 years! Castro's brief was, of course, rejected, and he turned to conspiracy. On July 26, 1953, the date that was to become the title of his movement, he led 170 young men in a foolhardy assault on the Moncada army barracks in Santiago de Cuba, in his native Oriente province. The revolt was drowned in blood, Batista's troops killing most of the 70 prisoners they took by castrating them and letting them bleed to death. Castro and his 20-year-old brother Raúl were captured in the Sierra Maestra hills, and escaped being killed only by a series of lucky accidents.

At his trial before the Urgency Court that October, Castro acted as his own attorney. In a remarkable five-hour summation (published in English under the title, *History Will Absolve Me*) he defiantly admitted his leadership of the uprising, and outlined the comprehensive plan of social and political reform for Cuba that he would have put into effect had the revolt succeeded.

Sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, Fidel and Raúl actually served 19 months in the Boniato penitentiary on the Isle of Pines, then were released under a general amnesty. They left almost immediately for Mexico, where other exiles of the 26th of July movement were waiting for them. It was in Mexico that they met Ernesto "Che" Guevara, the young Argentine physician who was to become a brilliant guerrilla leader and chief theoretician of their movement. On December 2, 1956, they put a force of 80 men ashore near a small fishing village in Oriente. Their yacht, the *Gramma*, went aground, and they had to abandon their painfully-collected radio transmitters, arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies. Coordinated uprisings elsewhere in the island were crushed; pursued by US-trained and equipped regular troops, and bombed and strafed by US-built aircraft, only Fidel, Raúl, Guevara, and nine others got away to a hideaway in the mountains. It was many months before this nucleus collected enough men to begin guerrilla operations.

Other groups meanwhile launched attacks of their own against Batista. In Matanzas province there was a Castro-style assault on the Goicuría barracks which was suppressed; in Havana a group of students headed by José A. Echevarría briefly seized the radio station and the presidential palace, but failed to find Batista and were hunted down, tortured and shot. The army and the police were by this time understandably jittery, and ready to kill on mere suspicion. To be young in those days was to be suspect, and to be a university student was enough in many cases to warrant a sentence of death. Hundreds of mangled bodies were dumped in the streets in a grotesque variation on the old Spanish colonial practice of public executions. All told, Batista's second dictatorship cost the Cuban people some 20,000 dead out of a population of less than seven million, far more proportionately than the US lost in both world wars.

By the end of 1957 Castro's operations in the Sierra were in full swing, with hundreds of peasants and young men from the cities buying or stealing rifles and joining the rebels. The bearded guerrillas blew up bridges and trains, burned cane fields, and made lightning raids on army posts to secure supplies. Castro's movement had support and financial help from all classes; even the well-to-do could no longer stomach the bribery and growing brutality of the regime. Batista's 46,000-man army was thus engaged in an open war against most if not all of the nation.

Any Fighting?

Ambassador Smith tried to persuade Homer Bigart of *The New York Times* not to go to the Sierra because Castro was "just a Communist with a small band of thieves and robbers." In November 1957, US Air Force Major General Truman H. Landon flew into Havana to award the Legion of Merit to Colonel Carlos Tabernilla of the Cuban Air Force, who had directed a bombing raid on the city of Cienfuegos shortly before. That same month, US Marine Corps General Lemuel C. Shepherd publicly toasted Batista as "a great general [and] a great president." In December, 1958, less than a month before Batista's fall, Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana gave a press conference in Havana in which he urged that arms shipments to the Cuban government be resumed:

> "Of course, I don't know much about it, but if a nation requires weapons to maintain internal security, I personally cannot understand why they should not be shipped. . . . People on the Washington level evidently feel that the shipment of weapons to the Cuban government under the circumstances might be picked up by Russia for propaganda purposes. But I do not think this is valid. It would be a tragedy for Cuba if civil war were to take place here. The poor people would be the ones to suffer. And Cuba is too prosperous and too wonderful a little island for such a thing to happen."

Asked if he thought Cuba was in a state of civil war, Ellender cautiously replied, "I don't know of any. Has there been any fighting?"

The Pentagon had reluctantly canceled further arms shipments to Batista in March, 1958, but American military training missions were retained. In a letter to President Eisenhower dated August 26, 1958, José

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Miro Cardona, representing the rebel forces in exile in Miami, asked that these missions be withdrawn, as it was "obvious that they train and support the armed forces of the dictatorship to kill Cubans." The State Department thought it over for seven weeks, and then explained that withdrawal of missions in case of a civil war was "permissive rather than mandatory," and that "hemispheric defense needs" required the US to continue training Batista's men. Our officers remained to the very end; a few of them were on hand at Camp Columbia when Castro's victorious *barbudos* rolled in to take over. Visitors to the city of Santa Clara can still see the marks of the bombardment by B-26 airplanes on December 28-31, 1958, and are shown fragments of bombs marked with a handshake and the words:

Mutual Defense
MADE IN U.S.A.

Given this record of US assistance to the dictatorship (which paralleled similar efforts on behalf of other authoritarian regimes in the hemisphere) it is easy to understand why Castro came to power with the strong conviction that our government wanted to destroy him. "The tyranny," he told his supporters, "unquestionably counted on the support of the US. . . . Batista managed to keep his troops in action for so long by telling them that he had US backing." In January, 1959, enroute to Havana for his triumphant entry into the capital, he warned the State Department not to intervene in Cuba as it had done in Guatemala five years before: "If you send Marines, thousands of them will die on the beaches." Guevara, who held a minor post in the Arbenz government in Guatemala when a CIA-backed "rebellion" overthrew the regime, was, as he still is, even more outspokenly anti-American.

Batista's last years had been so bad that even those who profited from the regime welcomed deliverance from it. Castro's first cabinet was made up of well-to-do, moderate men, newspaper owners, lawyers, engineers, a judge. The regime's public trials and executions of Batista police and army officers, so much criticized outside the island, dealt out a rough justice that most Cubans welcomed. After the uproar over the executions died down, Castro made a reasonably successful "unofficial" visit to the US, though he frightened American security officials by his habit of plunging into the midst of excited crowds, and puzzled Washington by doing a "Nixon" and talking to people he saw in the streets.

The Question of Expropriation

Soon after his return to Cuba, however, Castro began to make clear what he had meant when he told cheering crowds in Havana that "the Revolution has not yet ended in Cuba; it has just begun." On May 17, 1959, at his old headquarters in the Sierra Maestra, he signed the epochal Agrarian Reform Law, and with it began the transformation of the social structure of the Cuban countryside. The provisions of the law were, in appearance, moderate. Private landlords were permitted to keep 1,000 acres of land, or 3,300 acres in land devoted to cane, rice, or cattle (actually 1,500 acres has been the allowed upper limit in practice). In view of the fertility of Cuba's soil, and the fact that crops can be grown all year round, these are generous limits. Larger estates *(latifundia)* were to be expropriated, leaving the owner with a nucleus of 1,000 acres, and payment made in 20-year 4.5 percent bonds, at a value based on the tax valuations made of their property by the owners themselves.

As the question of expropriation caused a rift in the revolution inside Cuba and the first break in Cuban-American relations, it is worth examining closely. The right of a sovereign government to expropriate private property is a solidly established legal principle everywhere in the world. In Spanish law, furthermore, fee-simple land holdings do not exist, and all property is held on a contingent basis at the pleasure of the sovereign. Article 90 of the Cuban constitution of 1940 formally outlawed large estates, so that after that date *latifundias* continued to exist only because the government failed to implement the law. The decree creating the new National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) was therefore justifiable under both Cuban and international law.

The carrying out of the decree, however, has not always been in accordance with the letter of the law. Officials of the INRA simply appear on a farm without any legal authorization and seize everything in sight, including buildings, trucks, and farm machinery. No inventory is taken, no receipt given. The farmland involved is often worth as much as five or six times what it is listed for in the assessment books, and Cuban 4.5 percent bonds are now selling for 36 on the New York market. Furthermore, few of the bonds have actually been printed, and INRA officials are exasperatingly vague about their plans to issue them. One American cattle-ranch owner who left Havana on the plane with me said he had waited nine months without receiving a penny for his land or livestock. If he ever should get his bonds he thought he could consider himself lucky to realize even five cents on every dollar he had invested.

One can therefore appreciate the grievances of such victims of the agrarian reform, whom the Cubans call *siquitrillados* ("cicatrized one"; literally, a fighting cock that has been mortally wounded). Their plight, however, should not obscure the larger picture, in which farms held by individuals were comparatively unimportant (see box on page 12).

Under the American quota system and the International Sugar agreement, production of Cuba's major

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Who Owned Cuba?

According to the Agricultural Census of 1946 more than one third of all the crop land in Cuba was owned by about 900 large corporations, some of them possessing as much as 610,000 acres. Small farmers working 25 acres or less had only a tenth as much land as was given over to the *latifundias*, and this was generally the poorest land.

	Number	*Holdings*	*Percent of Farmland*
Farms under 25 acres	62,500	730,000 acres	3.3
Largest estates	894	8,000,000 acres	36.

Between them the big sugar companies and the cattle ranches owned 17 million acres of land and dominated Cuban agriculture.

Although American investment in Cuba had been shifting away from agriculture since the Thirties, US-owned companies still owned 40 percent of the sugar lands, including seven of the ten largest *latifundias:*

Company	*Holdings (caballerias:* 33.5 acres)
Cuban Atlantic (US)	18,500
Julio Lobo (Cuban)	12,300
Cuban American (US)	10,800
Falla Gutierrez (Cuban)	10,800
American Sugar Refining (US)	10,200
United Fruit (US)	8,600
West Indies Sugar (US)	7,800
Vertientes Camaguey (US)	7,900
Gomez Mena (Cuban)	6,300
Manati Sugar (US)	5,800

The benefits of Cuban participation in the US sugar quota, which have often been described as exemplifying generosity toward Cuba, have actually worked most of all to the advantage of the big US companies. Most of the difference between the world price of sugar and the price paid by US refineries went as profits to these dominant companies. The Cuban farmworkers, who literally lived on the edge of starvation, derived no benefit whatever from the quota system.

Sugar *latifundias* took up 22 percent of the total land area of Oriente province, 27 percent of Camaguey, and 36 percent of Matanzas; the whole of the Isle of Pines, 3,000 square kilometers, was owned by four landlords.

crop was tightly controlled, with allowable sales rigidly parcelled out. The big companies could produce their quotas on about half their land; hence they let about 3 million acres lie fallow. Sugar is an intensely seasonal crop, requiring abundant labor only during the 3-4 month *zafra* (harvest) when the big mills run 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. During those months, hundreds of thousands of cane-cutters had to earn enough to enable them to survive somehow until the next *zafra.* This system led to a cruel paradox: unemployment, poverty, and actual hunger in the presence of some of the most fertile (and unused) land in the world.

The big companies in most cases got their land for a small fraction of its present worth. In 1905, for example, the Nipe Bay Company, a predecessor of United Fruit, bought 122,000 acres of cane-land in Oriente province for $100. In the early years of American occupation of the island and under complaisant Cuban presidents thereafter all kinds of *geofagia* ("earth-eating," the fraudulent possession of land), tax evasion, and avoidance of labor legislation were possible. Cuban-American, United Fruit and the rest amortised their original investments decades ago, and have financed expansion out of profits. During the years 1935-1957 the eight largest American sugar firms made an average net profit of 23 percent a year, most of which was sent to the US in the form of interests and dividends.

Well-to-do Cubans also built up nest-eggs in banks in the United States; despite the underdeveloped state of the Cuban economy, the island was actually exporting capital.

It is true that the assessed valuations upon which payment for expropriated land is to be based are unrealistically low. But the companies themselves set that value on their land; to complain of it is to convict themselves of tax evasion under the previous regime. After visiting United Fruit Company's estates in Preston, and seeing the poverty of men who have worked there for 20 and 30 years, one becomes somewhat doubtful of the moral right of the corporation to payment in full, and in cash, for its estates. As a Cuban Army lieutenant said to me: "These people are in the position of a gambler who started out with 10 cents and won a hundred dollars. They spent most of the hundred dollars, and we are giving them their 10 cents back, but they want cash for all their chips."

An Amiable Revolution

The man who supervises the immense operation is INRA director Antonio Núñez Jiménez, former Professor of Geography at the University of Las Villas, and at 37 the "old man" of the revolutionary leadership. Núñez, a learned firebrand, has a phenomenal knowledge of Cuban geography, land-forms and natural

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resources. He and his staff divided the island's six provinces into 28 Zones of Agricultural Development and enthusiastically began to reshape Cuba's agricultural economy.

The INRA began with the properties that already belonged to the Cuban government, and with the extensive estates taken from Batista officials. Cattle lands were seized next, to prevent their owners from slaughtering the herds and selling off the beef. The big sugar estates were not touched until after the end of the *zafra* this May. The expropriation process is now substantially complete, and there is not a single *latifundia* left on the island. It should be pointed out that the reform is directed against all large estates, Cuban as well as American, including the extensive holdings of the Castro family in Oriente. The process of expropriation, as explained above, is usually quite informal; one INRA official offered to look up one of the plantations on his list and take it over that day so that I could witness the operation.

In handling these properties that have come into their hands, more than half of Cuba's 28 million acres, the INRA's young men have acted with an amiable lack of ideology. The Soviet regime, for example, stubbornly insisted on complete nationalization and the wiping out of property in land; collectivization was accomplished only at an immense cost in suffering and in lives. The Bolivian National Revolution, on the other hand, made the opposite mistake of turning the land over to the Indians who were working on it, with a consequent disastrous drop in production. Mexico dragged the process out for more than a generation, and never really solved the problems of credit, mechanization, marketing, and technical assistance.

Major Núñez' men have left about 40 percent of Cuba's farmland, owned in parcels of less than 1,000 acres, in the hands of its original owners. About a quarter of the land, which was being worked by tenants, sharecroppers, or squatters, is being turned over to them without charge, in lots up to 66 acres. These farmers are individualists with a strong sense of private property, and accustomed to working on their own. To have herded them into cooperatives would have conflicted with small-holder habits. By cancelling their former burdensome rents and presenting them with handsomely engraved titles to the property they are cultivating, the Revolution won for itself an immediate and tremendous popularity with this important social class.

The INRA, to be sure, retains control of the lands that it has thus "turned over" to peasant proprietors. It requires the owners to use INRA machinery and marketing facilities, and to plant the crops "suggested" by the local INRA manager. Couples who have been living together under the usual Cuban common-law arrangement are not given land titles until they are formally married. Proprietorship of such a limited kind would certainly be considered "slavery" by Senator Goldwater – but so far it appears to be highly satisfactory to the Cuban small holder. In Matanzas province alone over 1,000 titles to small farms were given out this July 26, and all the landholders I talked to were pleased with the new order. It remains to be seen how well this closely-controlled system of private ownership will work in the long run.

On the rest of the land, which had been in big ranches or sugar plantations, Fidel Castro himself made the bold decision to move directly from the *latifundia* to the collective farm, or cooperative. The first of these to be established, the *Cuba Libre* cooperative in Matanzas province, was sixteen months old when I visited it this July, and may provide a fair sample of the movement as a whole. The land, some 1,400 acres, formerly belonged to a Batista official who fled to Miami when the collapse came, so that no expropriation proceedings were necessary. A lieutenant in the Rebel Army was sent in and the cooperative organized on March 10, 1959, the anniversary of Batista's second siezure of power. The *finca* (plantation) then had 800 acres planted in cane, and another 600 acres idle; the *guajiros* had not been allowed to have garden plots, or keep a cow, as that would have diminished the owner's profit from the company store.

Under the old system, when the last of the cane was cut and the rainy season began each May, the workers here faced the dreaded eight months of *tiempo muerto* ("dead time"). During the "dead time" the men worked for as little as $5 a month, and their annual income was less than $400 a year (the Cuban peso is theoretically at par with the dollar, and its purchasing power is about the same). When the harvest ended, the workers stopped eating meat, and used up the last kerosene in their lamps. After a few months there was no longer enough money left to buy even beans or rice, staple items in the Cuban diet. The *guajiros* turned to *malanga*, a potato-like root native to the island, or they went hungry. Under Batista there was no school, no doctor, no running water, no electricity, no toilet or even privy, no milk for the children (a can of condensed milk imported from the US cost 22 cents in the owner's store). Only one in four or five of the adults was able to read or write even a little; what good was education anyway – there were no books or newspapers on the *finca*.

Break-Even Prices

Since the founding of the cooperative, living standards at *Cuba Libre*, I was told, have risen noticeably. The INRA's first step was to begin construction of concrete-block housing for the *cooperativistas*. These are modest but comfortable structures, with tile floors, electricity, running water, toilets, and roofs of proc-

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essed *bagasse* (the crushed cane left after the sugar is extracted). Using mass production methods, and building without cellars or heating equipment (not needed in the Cuban climate), the INRA put these homes up for less than $2,000 each. Title to them is given at once, and the cost is being paid out of the cooperatives' profits. Last year 10,000 such homes were built by the INRA's Department of Farm Homes to replace the picturesque but squalid *bohío*, with its palm-thatched roof and dirt floor. This year 22,000 more are scheduled to go up. (The figures are from the INRA's Department of Publicity; for those who are skeptical I can only say that I personally saw hundreds of houses being built in Matanzas province alone, and that the men building them were working harder and faster than any other construction workers I ever saw – and under a mid-summer Cuban sun). The newer model houses, with more rooms, better design, and concrete-slab roofs to offer better protection from the heat are noticeably superior to those I saw at *Cuba Libre*.

Another innovation at *Cuba Libre* is the *tienda del pueblo*, or people's store, one of the more than 2,000 established by the INRA. The old company store operated on a mark-up of 100 percent, often gave short weight and inferior goods, and charged high interest. (Some of the workers still owed money on their parents' accounts, and one man showed me the record of a debt incurred by his grandfather that he had been paying off 40 years later – with interest). The new store, which is beginning to get its merchandise from the cooperatives themselves, charges only enough to break even on staple items, and makes a small profit on toiletries, perfume, etc. The store is well-stocked, with items that these people could not afford before – canned goods, shoes (especially important in Cuba to prevent parasitic infections), toothpaste, light-bulbs, and dozens of other items that Americans never think about, but which are still semi-luxuries in rural Cuba. During my stay at *Cuba Libre* a shipment of rice came in from the *Antonio Maceo* cooperative and a load of fish from a new co-op at Varadero beach. This interchange of products is helpful in cost-cutting and in saving foreign exchange, for both rice and canned fish used to be imported from the US. The INRA was arranging to bring in a herd of 50 cows to supply milk at five cents a liter to the co-op and also to the surrounding farmers.

A third achievement of the cooperative system is the provision of free medical and dental care, and the beginning of preventive medicine in an area that had known neither doctors nor hospitals. Last year Castro made a television appeal to younger doctors to serve voluntarily out in the countryside for six months, and many recent graduates of the newly-reopened medical school in Havana responded. I saw all the children in the *Cuba Libre* region brought in for polio shots; "under Batista," the young doctor explained, "only the cattle got vaccinated." The INRA has dug two wells to provide pure water, and built latrines for those who do not yet have new homes. A beginning is being made in checking parasitic diseases, which are a dreadful scourge all over rural Latin America, but the soil and water in the area is so thoroughly polluted that it will take a generation to finish the job.

A final, and most significant achievement of the cooperative, has been crop diversification and the use of formerly uncultivated land. To the 800 acres that were always in cane the cooperative director has added a number of new crops: 140 acres in potatoes, 70 *in judias* (black beans), 30 in peanuts, 40 in *fruta bomba* (a native fruit), 6 in cucumbers, and 50 in forage crops for the expected cattle shipment. As the land has been fallow for many years, the crops were doing particularly well; the INRA had also supplied 8 new tractors and 3 pumps that were irrigating 700 acres.

My visit to *Cuba Libre* came during the middle of the "dead time." The 71 *cooperativistas* and their families, however, were busy harvesting potatoes and planting peanuts, clearing cane fields and building new roads, so that there was an actual shortage of labor. People came in from the city of Matanzas, and even from Havana on Sundays to help out with carpentry, road-building, or in the fields. City workers who once looked down on the *guajiro* as a *bobo* (literally, clown) are now enthusiastically volunteering to make a success of the agrarian program of the revolution.

Gambling On the Farmer

All in all, the *Cuba Libre* cooperative was one of the most hopeful social experiments I have seen during nine months' travel in Latin America this year and last. One man of 40 with whom I had a long talk showed me his old credit book, in which it was noted that he owed the landlord $420 at the start of 1958. "I worked for him for 23 years, and had nothing but the clothing on my back, and that *bohio* to live in, and I owed him money – and we hardly ever saw his face to know what he looked like." Since the founding of *Cuba Libre* this man's debt has been cancelled; he has bought a new bed, table and chairs, is paying for a refrigerator on the installment plan, and can look ahead eventually to the distribution of profits each December after the cooperative has repaid its debt to the INRA.

When I asked if any of the members of the cooperative would like to do away with the Castro regime, the response was invariably an astonished stare or a burst of laughter. Under Batista it had been a crime to own a firearm, or even a small pen-knife. The new government has given the volunteer militia corps (20 men, six women) an assortment of old pistols, 19th century Krag-Jorgensens, and 1903 Springfields, and

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they take turns patrolling their land. The volunteers have no spit and polish about them, but they would make their island a difficult place to conquer.

But *Cuba Libre* is by no means an outstanding cooperative, even in its own province. The *Antonio Maceo* co-op is far larger, with a tractor maintenance and repair station, and special machinery for drying and polishing rice; at the *José Smith Cardonas* cooperative 180 prefabricated houses are being built. The new cane sugar cooperatives that were formed this July are much bigger than those which preceded them, and will be a great test of the government's strained resources. There are special show-places, like *Los Rios* and *Hermanos Saiz* in Pinar del Rio province, which give a good idea of what the government ultimately aspires to do. But the ordinary co-op, visited at random and without a pre-arranged tour, is impressive enough.

As Tad Szulc pointed out in a series of articles in *The New York Times* (August 1-4), none of the cooperatives is as yet operating at a profit. *Cuba Libre*, for example, got a $65,000 loan from the INRA to finance its ambitious program of capital improvements, and will take a number of years to pay it back. The government, perhaps for political, perhaps for humanitarian reasons, decided to ignore orthodox financial procedures, to pump money into Cuba's rural economy and to count on getting it back through increased productivity. It will be some years yet before it will be known whether this gamble pays off, but it is already clear that production of many key crops has gone up substantially. Under the old system, Cuba did not produce enough to feed her own people. Potatoes, butter, lard, eggs, evaporated milk, and all kinds of canned fruits and vegetables were brought in from the US. INRA's private farms and cooperatives are rapidly changing this, and as a result farmers in the US may lose one of their best markets; indeed in a few years they may face a small but sturdy competitor in the export trade. Cuban labor costs are lower, and her climate at least as good for all the crops listed above. Cuban farms regularly produce two crops of corn a year, one in the wet season, and another in the dry, and the INRA's record of one bale of cotton per acre is considerably above the US average. Cuban vegetables, arriving in the US market during the winter, are of excellent quality and bring premium prices. As for sugar, Cuban production would wipe out the high cost beet and sugar cane industries in this country overnight were it not for the protective barrier of the quota system.

In addition to farm housing, schools, clinics and other rural activities, INRA has become a sort of catch-all for whatever the regime wants done. At the present time it operates over 150 factories with a net value of $300 million. Among these are more than two dozen canneries, fifteen shipyards, cement plants, slaughterhouses, tractor stations, sugar mills, radio stations, tourist centers, and a factory for the production of fertilizer from bat dung. This last is a special favorite of Major Núñez, who has explored nearly every major cave on the island. During his visit to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union this summer, Núñez announced that he had made the arrangements for the purchase of 56 factories at a cost of $100 million, among them a steel mill with a capacity of 1 million tons a year. His organization, a kind of super-TVA, is clearly going to be the dominant factor in Cuban economic life, no matter what political institutions are evolved.

Other branches of the revolutionary government are conducted with the INRA's pragmatism. The National Institute of Savings and Loans (INAV), to illustrate, takes advantage of the craze for lotteries that Cubans share with the rest of Latin America. But prizes have been reduced to more modest amounts (the winning number gets $100,000), and the tickets have been turned into a kind of bond, which can be cashed in after 10 years at face value plus a small amount of interest. With the lottery profits ($24 million in 1959) the INAV builds private homes for sale to city workers. These are more luxurious versions of the INRA farm homes, but built with the same mass-production economies. Savings made by the elimination of middlemen, real estate agents, profits, and speculation are passed along to the purchaser, and amortization is scaled according to the buyer's income:

Family Income (Maximum)	*Mortgage*	*Monthly Payments* $5,400 House	$6,300 House
$100	30 years	$15.01	$17.51
$150	25	18.04	21.01
$250	20	27.32	31.88
$350	20	29.97	34.97
$450	20	32.72	38.18
Over $450	20	35.64	41.58

INAV houses are modest, but to people who have moved into them from wretched urban slums, they seem like palaces. The average American finds it hard to realize what running water or a refrigerator means, to a housewife who never thought she could have either.

Tourism and Education

Thanks to Castro's windy anti-American rhetoric the big hotels in downtown Havana are yawningly empty, and the bright young croupiers in the casinos have nothing to do but play solitaire. Yet the loss of revenue is not quite as serious as it appears. During the 1950's tourists from the US spent about $40 million a year in Cuba, but Cubans travelling the other way spent nearly as much, so that the net gain in dollars was only about $2 million a year. Officials of the revo-

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lutionary government, unlike Batista's men, do not make lavish trips to New York and Miami, bringing back expensive American automobiles. Travel to the US is strongly discouraged, and those who go can only take $150 with them in legally acquired dollars. Instead, the National Tourist Bureau (INIT) is now developing internal tourism, and has opened dozens of attractive and inexpensive resorts on the sea coast and in the mountains. One can, for example, go deep-sea fishing on an expropriated yacht run by officers of the Cuban Navy for a few dollars a day, or rent a house on the beach for $20 a week. The big-spending crowd that came to the Havana Hilton and National hotels, and filled the night clubs and the gambling casinos, is not likely to come back soon. But Americans looking for an inexpensive vacation in the sun are beginning to come in small numbers. I met a number of American Negroes in Havana who were enthusiastic about Cuba. "If we went to Miami," they pointed out, "no matter how much money we had we couldn't stay in a place like this." (The misrepresentation of the Castro regime by the Miami *Herald* may be motivated in part by the fact that Miami is badly overbuilt in resort hotels, half a dozen of which have gone bankrupt this year).

Another new, or rather revitalized, agency of the revolutionary government is the Ministry of Education, run by Dr. Armando Hart. Under the old regime one-fourth of the annual budget was devoted to education. But, according to the census of 1953, three out of five Cubans had spent only three years or less in school, and one-third of the adult population was illiterate. Mismanagement, graft, and *palanca* (influence; literally, a lever) wasted huge amounts of money. Many teachers with life tenure never entered a classroom, but hired a substitute with a part of their salary; there were 1,315 inspectors for 18,000 classrooms. Exactly one new school was built in Havana between 1902 and 1958. Premier Castro takes a direct interest in education. Moncada and Goicuría, along with all the other Batista barracks associated with killing and torture for so many years, have been turned into schools. In the Sierra Maestra region, where the difficulties of transport and teacher recruitment kept previous governments from attempting to build schools, the new regime is building the Camilo Cienfuegos School City, to provide education for 20,000 children from the ages of 6 to 18. They will live in dormitories now being constructed by the army, and produce enough on school farms and workshops to make the enterprise self-sufficient. A boarding school is needed in the Sierra for the same reason "consolidated" schools are needed in many parts of the US, because the population is scattered in pockets so small as to make any other arrangement impractical. But the regime, with its Cuban and Catholic emphasis on the family unit, does not favor such schools; the Camilo Cienfuegos School City will be the only one in the country. Americans who have been dragging their feet over local bond issues, desegregated classrooms and federal aid to education might learn something from the sign over an administrator's desk in Camp Columbia:

BE BRIEF
WE HAVE ALREADY LOST FIFTY-EIGHT YEARS.

A final institutional change brought about by the revolution has been the destruction of the old professional army and its replacement by the Rebel Army and the volunteer militia. Batista's armed forces, like those in Latin America generally, were expensive, top-heavy, and intended for use against the civilian population. Yet in spite of their overwhelming advantages in numbers and equipment and the special training they got from US instructors, they were defeated by a guerrilla army that was never a tenth as large. Army pay has been cut to modest levels, fancy uniforms replaced by olive-green work clothes, medals and all ranks above the level of Major done away with. Cut to one-third the size of Batista's establishment, the army busies itself with such unmilitary tasks as building schools and houses, doing farm work, running tourist resorts and operating factories that turn out household equipment like stoves, plumbing and kitchenware. There is no caste distinction between officers and men. Batista's soldiers ruled by terror; Castro's bearded troops, well-disciplined and incorruptible, are welcomed by the populace wherever they go.

For defense against foreign enemies and internal sabotage, the Army relies upon some 500,000 part-time militia, who spend a few hours a week in training and standing guard. These volunteers would give a West Point officer nightmares. They smoke cigarettes and watch television while on duty; they can resign whenever they like; they are armed with a weird assortment of left-over firearms which they readily hand over to strangers for inspection.

Will Castro Be Overthrown?

Some American newspapermen and some in the State Department have not given up hope that the Castro regime may be overthrown from within. There are, indeed, a number of dissatisfied elements, both inside Cuba and in exile around the Caribbean, foremost of which are those of Batista's officers who escaped to Miami, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic. Many of them got away with substantial amounts of money, more than enough to organize conspiracies; others, penniless, are desperately anxious to get back into power. But they are few in number and have no popular following. The testimony and advice on Cuban affairs of such men as Pilar García, Roland Masferrer,

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Esteban Ventura, Eusebio Mujal, Jacinto Menocal, Carlos Tabernilla and Francisco Tabernilla, all former officials of Batista now in exile in this country, should be accepted with great caution.

A second and much more important nucleus of opposition to Castro is formed by well-to-do businessmen and landowners who have been injured by the regime's economic policies – the Agrarian Reform Law, labor legislation, rent cuts, import restrictions. Ironically, the 26th of July movement was financed by many of these same middle and upper-class Cubans, who hoped that Castro would install a middle-class parliamentary democracy; when he unleashed a social revolution that struck at their economic interests, they felt betrayed, and a growing number of them feel about Castro the way the "economic royalists" felt about FDR, and for the same reasons. (Fidel Castro himself is from a well-to-do landholding family in Oriente, and I heard one businessman in a plush Havana bar complain that "Fidel is a traitor to his class.")

There is no doubt of the growing alienation of this important social group. Here are my notes of an interview with a former landlord, carried on in conspiratorial whispers in *Liceo*, a professional and businessman's club in the city of Matanzas.

"I had 480 acres of land, planted to cane and citrus. We wanted a real agrarian reform, where they would pay for the land – a legal reform. I fought for the revolution, but now we have less liberty than under Batista. My workers liked me; I treated them well. Now they are forced to work on those cooperatives – 'communistives,' I call them. Everything is going to pieces here – rice is scarce and expensive, I can't get parts for my autos, there are no American cigarettes. Castro? – of course, he's a Communist. He started this revolution because he's illegitimate – hates his father and wants to get even with him. I happen to know he has $20 million on deposit in a bank in Texas. It can't last – your government has got to do something about it. The Marines? *Ojala* that they come – the Cubans will kiss them as deliverers. But they should be sent soon – or else it will be too late. Or else put a blockade around Cuba – don't sell her anything – that will teach those blockheads a lesson."

Men as bitter as this will surely support any counter-revolutionary movement that comes along. But so far they have not been willing to take the risks that Castro and his men took when they began their campaign against Batista.

Another growing nucleus of discontent is centered around those in the Catholic Church who are worried by the regime's ties with the Soviet bloc. Fidel was originally on very good terms with the Church, and even fiery-tempered Raúl liked to quote from papal encyclicals and be photographed with priests. But in recent months members of the hierarchy have been increasingly critical of the revolution. Msgr. Enrique Pérez Serrantes, who saved Fidel's life in 1953, issued a pastoral letter this June warning that "the [Communist] enemy is within the gates." Msgr. Eduardo Boza Masvidal, auxiliary Bishop of Havana, followed up with a warning that "confiscation or arbitrary and unjustified expropriation is theft," and that "it is anti-Christian to stir up hatred and class struggle." Most recently, Msgr. Evelio Diaz has complained of persecution of the Church in Cuba, and threatened to end all services on the island if religious freedom is not guaranteed.

Still, I do not believe that at the present time these and other dissatisfied elements represent any serious threat to the government; even among the "cicatrized ones" who have lost their property to the Agrarian Reform, Castro may command a majority. Several former land-owners in Matanzas and Camaguey provinces told me that they considered the regime's seizure of property hasty and somewhat unjust, but that they were willing to bear their losses for the national good. "The truth is," said one physician, who had lost an inherited estate of a few hundred acres, "that the people who rented my land lived like animals. Fidel is the only one who thought of doing something for them; and it is better this way." The Church also is divided. One of the most fervent revolutionaries I met in Cuba was a Franciscan priest in Jovellanos, who swore that Fidel was carrying out the teaching of Christ and of the social encyclicals. Most of the native-born Cuban priests appear to favor the Revolution, but about four out of every seven priests on the island are from Spain, and many of them have conservative, pro-Franco sentiments.

Free Elections

In the absence of elections or of a free press (the government now has all but absolute control of the mass media), an accurate assessment of popular sentiment in Cuba today is hard to arrive at, and the situation is changing so rapidly that what is true one month may not be true the next. Nevertheless, there is still general agreement even among those most critical of the regime that the government still commands a substantial majority. A poll published in the magazine *Bohemia* this spring, before its editor, Angel Quevedo, turned against Castro and went into voluntary exile, showed 85 percent in favor of the regime. Another poll taken by the Institute for International Public Opinion Research, a private American company, found 43 percent "fervent" supporters of the government, and another 43 percent "moderate" supporters, with 10 percent in outright opposition. A Princeton University survey of 1,000 Cubans, also published this summer, indicated 86 percent in favor of the regime.

Of a dozen taxi-drivers I queried in Havana, all of

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them injured by the slump in tourism, only one wanted to see a change in the government, "somebody who will not be so angry at the United States, who will make the Americans come back." The others were willing to hold on and hope for better days. "It is bad for us, sure, but this government is better for Cuba." In the countryside, among *cooperativistas*, former tenants and sharecroppers, I did not find a single critic. Of the hundreds I talked to on the island about politics, only a handful were anti-Fidelistas: the angry landlord whose views I have quoted above, a devout old woman I met in the Church at Matanzas, a Jesuit, two Havana University law students, and a waiter in an empty hotel who told me to "take Fidel and Raúl and Ché back with you when you go home."

If this estimate of the situation is correct, why does the government not legitimize its power by holding elections? Why does it keep such a tight grip on TV, the radio, and newspapers? Why the frenetic anti-American speeches which would seem to suggest a weak regime in need of an external scapegoat? Why the new ties of dependence with the USSR and Red China? Why the heavy arms purchases, the endless drilling of militia? Why have Cubans whose sincerity and disinterestedness seemed above question been driven into exile? In July, for example, José Miró Cardona, an internationally known jurist who was the regime's first Premier and its Ambassador-designate to the United States, broke with Castro and took asylum in the Argentine Embassy in Havana. Angel Quevedo, editor of the once strongly pro-Castro *Bohemia*, and Major Raúl Chibas, who had fought in the Sierra Maestra and served as the Revolutionary government's Railroad Commissioner, soon followed, both charging that their hopes for Cuba had been betrayed. Dozens of other former supporters of the 26th of July movement have preceded or followed them, getting out while the getting was still good, with what property they still had, all giving as their reason the regime's Communist sympathies and its growing authoritarianism.

Much of the answer to why Castro behaves that way lies in the inherent tendency of all revolutions to drift to extremes. Castro's own views have changed since his days in the mountains. In an interview printed in *Coronet* (February, 1958), he promised "free and untrammelled freedom of public information," and said he would hold "truly honest general elections within 12 months." Now, however, he says that Cuba already has a "direct democracy," that the huge crowds he can call into the streets are sufficient proof of popular backing, that "we don't need elections, because the people support me anyway."

This, of course, is what dictatorial regimes have said before; but let us be frank: there *is* no great demand for elections in Cuba today. The political history of the island, like that of almost every other country in Latin America, is one of graft, vote-buying, and violence, "absolutism tempered by assassination." From 1902 to 1934 the United States exercised a veto power (through the Platt Amendment sanctioning military intervention in Cuba) that made Cuban elections essentially meaningless; for 25 years after that the US acquiesced in electoral pantomimes that left the same little group of Army officers, crooked politicians, and businessmen in power. Today, the crowds chant rhythmically at meeting, "*Elecciones, por que?*" (Elections? What for?)

Fidel's extraordinary and interminable television performances serve as a kind of never-ending political campaign, in which he explains over and over again what the government is planning to do, and why, and how it will affect Cuba. Americans for whom TV is a vehicle for *Gunsmoke* and Jack Paar are puzzled by why Cubans watch these monologues to the bitter end (their format is that of a press conference, but Fidel takes from one to two hours to answer each question). He has, however, a sure sense of drama, an instinct for the colorful gesture, the incandescent phrase. Time and again I heard illiterate *campesinos* (farmers) repeat the essentials of a complicated argument they heard from his lips on TV. The mass meetings that are called on an average of once a month are also evidence of the regime's support; each of them is attended by far more people than ever voted for any president in the history of the Cuban republic.

"Is this democracy?" It is a very Yankee, and to Cubans a very irritating, question. "You have plenty of things to take care of in your own country," one of the leaders of the University Students' Federation told me. "Why don't you give your Negroes a chance to go to good schools, and eat in the same restaurants with you, and vote." As *Verde Olivo*, the official Rebel Army magazine puts it, "When Americans come down here and tell us that Cuba must have free elections, we tell them that they never worried about elections when Batista was doing their dirty business for them. When Senator Eastland and Senator Ellender can tell us they have free elections in Mississippi and Louisiana, then we will have free elections here, too."

How Free Is the Press?

And what of a free press? Under Batista, each paper had an official censor, and editors were encouraged to see things the right way by regular payments from checking account No. 2515 of the *Banco de los Colonos* in Havana (the English-language *Havana Post*, and at least one US wire service man were on the subsidy list). Those who were stubborn, like Mario Kuchilán of *Prensa Libre*, were liable to be picked up by the secret police and dumped, beaten, out on the highway.

For the first six months after Castro came to power, the Cuban press was freer than it had ever been. Then,

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trouble began. In the first place, the revolutionary regime had ended the old subsidies, and without them many of Havana's 17 daily papers were no longer profitable. (New York City, with eight times as many people and over a hundred times more income than Havana, had less than half as many major newspapers.) Some publishers, like Jorge Zayas of *Avance* (see box on page 20) and Sergio Carbo of *Prensa Libre* owned lands that were expropriated, or apartment houses on which the rents were cut. When they printed attacks on the regime, which they did regularly, their reporters and linotype men insisted on adding *coletillas* ("little tails") which corrected or criticized their editorials from a revolutionary point of view.

In the end, the newspaper publishers decided to abandon the unequal and profitless contest. All of them carefully prepared for their exit; every one of them got away safely. None had ever fought the Batista tyranny, but they now presented themselves as martyrs for freedom of the press, and found a ready market for their stories in American newspapers and magazines.

The revolutionary government, which does not like to admit that it did anything to silence its critics, has actually taken over only one paper, *El Mundo* (which was owned by a Batista official). Most of the others are now published by committees of newspapermen, under profit-sharing arrangements, and vie with each other to see which is the most faithful to the *fidelista line*.

As for freedom of the non-Cuban press, it is still possible to buy *Life*, *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The New York Times* and even the Miami *Herald* in Cuba – all of which are of course critical of the Cuban government. The newspaper *Informacción* is still in the hands of its original owners; it is a rather dull sheet, but regularly publishes AP and UP bulletins critical of Castro and of the USSR; it printed editor Angel Quevedo's parting blast at the revolution this August. Anti-Communist magazines and books (*The New Class*, *Slave Labor in the USSR*, *What Happened in Hungary*) are readily available, as well as the government publications of Franco Spain. The campaign of harrassment of US newspapermen and photographers, which began only a few months ago, may be a signal that the regime means to clamp the lid on more tightly.

I have described the large ambitions of the regime. There are small gains, too. Some of the closed-down newspaper printing plants have been re-opened to publish cheap but handsome editions of Spanish classics – beginning with *Don Quixote*. The Havana shoeshine boys, those ragged little *mataperros* ("dogkillers") who eke out a precarious childhood all over Latin America, have been organized into a union, given free shoes and neat blue uniforms, made to go to school, and taken to the countryside for vacations. There have been stiff increases in liquor taxes, curbing drunkenness, and the narcotics trade appears to have been greatly reduced. Tens of thousands of trees have been planted on deforested and eroded hillsides all over the island.

Internally, then, despite the authoritarianism, the tensions and unresolved problems that attend great social changes, the Cuban revolution has markedly increased agricultural production; it is making good progress toward self-sufficiency in foodstuffs; it is bringing in new industries, and has already reduced unemployment, "that scourge which has always beaten our people." The government is honest and, all things considered, surprisingly efficient. The standard of living of middle and upper-class people, who were accustomed to American automobiles and other imported luxury goods, has gone down, in many cases precipitously; but the great majority of the Cuban people are better off than before. Hundreds of thousands of additional pupils have been sent to school, and the island is on its way to wiping out illiteracy. A program of medical care has been inaugurated. All over the island there are new roads, new bridges, new housing developments. We have been told again and again that these things are the best guarantees against Communism. Why is it then, that the Cuban Revolution is so violently anti-American, and why has it tied itself so closely to Communist China and the USSR?

Communist Ties

So much nonsense has been written about the question of Cuba and Communism that one almost despairs of getting at the truth. Part of the trouble lies in the careless use of words. To some, a Communist is one who belongs to a Communist Party and who works for the worldwide success of the movement headed by Nikita Khrushchev and/or Mao Tse-tung. To Batista and his men, and to Ambassadors Gardner and Smith, any person who wanted to overthrow the existing Cuban government was a Communist. The angry Matanzas landlord I have mentioned considered Fidel Castro a Communist because he took land without paying for it. A great many American newspaper publishers and government officials believe that anyone who is hostile to American business interests is a Communist. To complicate matters further, there are all the other imprecisely-used words thrown around more or less as synonyms: "leftist," "extremist," "fellow-traveler," "Marxist," "revolutionary," "red-lining," "crypto-Communist," and so on.

A great many seemingly obscure questions can be answered if we define our terms precisely enough. Is Cuba, for example, "a Red base in the Caribbean?" The answer is Yes, in the sense that the Communist Party (PSP) is legal there and growing in strength, that Cuba has recently re-established diplomatic relations

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Freedom of the Press – The Avance *Case*

The details of the *Avance* case have never been published in any newspaper in this country to our knowledge. They are therefore worth review as a commentary on the status of the press in both Cuba and the United States.

Avance was founded in 1934, with funds accumulated during his presidency (1921-1925) by Dr. Alfredo Zayas. During the Batista regime the paper was a faithful servant of the dictatorship, and its editor Jorge Zayas received regular payments from the Presidential secretary. During the first months of the Castro government his paper was rather favorable to the revolution; after the rent reductions and the agrarian reform law he became increasingly hostile. After Castro singled him out as one of those "who do not understand what a revolution is, who are not loyal Cubans," Zayas made careful plans to leave the country.

On January 20, 1960, he left for Miami on a regularly scheduled flight of Cubana Airlines. Four days later he was elected Regional Vice-President of the Inter-American Press Association's (SIP) Freedom of the Press Committee. That same day he published the first of a series of front-page articles in the *Miami Herald*, charging that Castro was a Communist, that he was misappropriating funds, that he was receiving Soviet arms, that he had established a reign of terror in Cuba, and that he planned to attack the Guantanamo Naval Base, and perhaps even Miami.

The Cuban government retaliated by publishing photostatic copies of the numerous $5,000 checks made out to Zayas by the Batista government and by reprinting editorials published in *Avance* between 1952 and 1958. Here are a few of these editorials:

"President Batista has, and it can't be denied, a genuinely revolutionary origin. Having arisen from chaos immediately after a regime that had a unanimous popular repulse . . . he gave the country a Constituent Assembly and impartial elections, as well as the full enjoyment of its political conquests." (Published March 11, 1952, the day after Batista seized power.)

"There is no doubt that yesterday's election was really encouraging. . . . It is obvious for General Batista's followers that the 10th of March had ample historical justification and consequently, they rushed to reiterate their enthusiastic support by giving him their votes." (Published November 4, 1954, after the fraudulent elections.)

"When a people has hopes it has to feel joyful, because the Constitution of 1940, having been restored and reinstated, now reincorporates the nation to the democratic order which it chose for itself. And this is one of the glorious achievements of General Batista." (Published February 25, 1955.)

"Tomorrow will be the saint's day of the President of the Republic, Fulgencio Batista Zaldivar, who will spend it happily with his family and his numerous friends and admirers. On such occasions *Avance* is particularly happy to express to him, cordially as well as respectfully, its salutations and best wishes, praying [that] the Almighty . . . will enable him to give a pacific and harmonious co-existence for all Cubans to enjoy." (Published January 15, 1957.)

These photostats and editorials were made available to the editors of the *Miami Herald* and its rival the *Miami News*, but no notice was taken of them.

On January 31, 1960, Zayas appeared on NBC's *Face the Nation*, where he repeated his charges: "There is no guarantee for any Cuban under the Castro regime. You never know when you are going to be thrown in jail. You never know when you might be sent to the execution squad. . . . There is already enough [opposition] to start a revolution."

NOVINS: Mr. Zayas, during the Batista regime, did you . . . receive any money from the regime?"

ZAYAS: Oh yes, we received money . . . during the political campaign of 1954. [The photostated checks are dated 1955, 1956, 1957, and 1958, as well as 1954.] I was doing there my little and modest part against Batista. . . . We were critical of the regime when there was no censorship. . . . But on the short periods when we had freedom of the press in Havana, my paper did a very good reporting of the revolutionary activities a very good reporting of the revolutionary activities. . . . For example, we were the only paper who sent two reporters to the hills. . . .

NOVINS: Did you print their reports?

ZAYAS: We printed one . . . because this reporter had been sent on December, 1958, so the story was still fresh for January when Batista fled.

LISAGOR: But you did not print it during Batista's tenure.

ZAYAS: We could not. We had a censor . . .

Still, viewers of *Face the Nation* almost certainly came away with the impression that here was an editor driven from Cuba by a Communist regime, which is the way most newspapers have handled the Zayas and similar cases. Little is written about freedom of the press elsewhere in the Caribbean, in Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua, or the Dominican Republic, where censorship, bribery, and even murder of newspapermen is common. Apparently these things are all right if a government "friendly" to the United States does them.

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with the USSR, and that the Castro regime evidently welcomes trade relations and military support from the Soviet bloc. The answer is No in the sense that neither the Soviet Union nor China control the Cuban government, that neither of those nations has any military forces in Cuba nor is about to send one there, and that the only foreign base in Cuba is the US naval station at Guantanamo. Is Cuba a "Soviet satellite?" Certainly the island's government has established very close commercial and diplomatic ties with the USSR and Communist China, and competes with those two governments in vituperative attacks on the United States. But, equally certainly, Fidel and Raúl and Ché Guevara are not puppets of Peking and the Kremlin, on a par with the native figurehead rulers in Tibet, Hungary or East Germany.

The revolution is, in the first place, and in its own peculiarly Cuban way, Marxist. Ché Guevara emphasized that fact in his speech to the First Latin American Youth Congress a few weeks ago:

"What is our ideology? If I were asked whether our revolution is Communist, I would define it as Marxist. Our revolution has discovered by its methods the paths that Marx pointed out." The heart of the revolution, the land reform program, is essentially Marxist. Despite its provision for private property in land, the INRA's goal is to do away with speculative profits, social distinctions, and economic exploitation.

Fidel, to be sure, arrived at this viewpoint much later than Ché or Raúl. In the 1958 *Coronet* interview quoted above he said, evidently with sincerity, that: "We have no plans for the expropriation or nationalization of foreign investments here. . . . I personally have come to feel that nationalization is, at best, a cumbersome instrument . . . foreign investments will always be welcome and secure here." For a long time Fidel liked to call his movement "humanism," and to speak simply of "liberty and bread without terror." Cuba's genuine Bolsheviks, the PSP, spoke of him then as a "fuzzy-minded bourgeois idealist [who] will never understand what revolution is." Now Castro castigates his old middle-class supporters as "unreliable," "not real revolutionaries": "When, after speaking well of the Revolution they say the first 'but,' be careful; at the second 'but,' things are dangerous; and at the third 'but,' you know you are dealing with a counter-revolutionary." His remarks at a meeting on October 26, 1959, called to protest the bombing of Havana by light planes based in Florida, had the authentic class-conscious ring: "Peasant detachments are the most efficient units of the army, peasants are the best soldiers of the revolutionary army. The small group of officers who expressed solidarity with the traitor Hubert Matos did not belong to this class of soldiers, were not soldiers and officers of peasant origin, who are the flower and heart of the most efficient, brave, and hard core of our revolutionary army."

It seems reasonably certain, on the other hand, that Fidel and the other top leaders of the Cuban government are not and never have been members of any Communist party either in Cuba or in exile, and that the Soviet Union does not control the 26th of July movement. On this question the testimony of Deputy CIA Director, General C. P. Cabell before the Senate Internal Security Committee on November 5, 1959, was clear.

SENATOR EASTLAND: "It is said that roughly 750 North Korean and Communist Chinese fought with the Castro forces. These people were not seen in the cities of Cuba, but were kept in the interior of Cuba. Do you have any knowledge of that?

GENERAL CABELL: "No sir; we do not, and we would seriously doubt the authenticity of any such figure. We have no evidence of any participation in the revolution. Nor do we have any knowledge of Chinese Communist participation.

SENATOR EASTLAND: "All right. What do you have information about? About what Communists fought in Castro's forces?"

GENERAL CABELL: "That question is related to the question: Is Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro a Communist? Let me develop that thought for you, sir. Our information shows that the Cuban Communists do not consider him a Communist Party member, or even a pro-Communist. . . . The Communists consider Castro as a representative of the bourgeoisie, and were unable to gain public recognition or commitments from him during the course of the revolution.

"We know that the Communists were concerned when, at the time of his trip to the United States, he showed evidence of a friendly attitude toward the United States. . . . In terms of a mass following they represent a minority, though a very well organized one. Within the 26th of July movement there is considerable evidence of opposition to Communism. . . ."

SENATOR JOHNSON (S.C.): "Is it not true that he, Fidel, is more dangerous than if he would come out and let them know that he was a Communist?"

GENERAL CABELL: "I personally would agree that Castro would probably lose much, or even most, of his popular support should this occur. However, we believe that Castro is not a member of the Communist Party, and does not consider himself to be a Communist."

Before the triumphant descent from the Sierra in January, 1959, relations between the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) and the 26th of July movement were quite hostile. The PSP dealt a severe blow to the revolution by helping to break the general strike that Fidel Castro called for April 9, 1958. The *barbudos* I spoke to were still very bitter when they remembered

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that the PSP leaders lived quietly in Havana while they fought and suffered in the mountains of Oriente.

Despite their rapprochement with the USSR and their growing tolerance of the PSP, Cuba's leaders display their Marxism with a difference. Fidel himself, who was educated in Jesuit schools and fought against the Communists as a student in the University of Havana, insists, "our revolution is as Cuban as our music. . . . Our movement is not red, but olive-green" (the color of the Rebel Army uniforms). Guevara, sometimes described as the regime's link with the Kremlin, specifically refused to join the Party during his stay in Guatemala. His father, an Argentine architect and builder, insists that Ché is a leftist, but not a Communist. When Mikoyan visited Cuba to sign a trade pact this February, several government officials embarrassed him by asking questions about the Hungarian revolt, and every revolutionary I spoke to insisted that he opposed Soviet control of the satellites for the same reason that he fought any US dominance over Cuba, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. The *barbudos*, from Fidel down, are an exhaustingly loquacious lot, but their quotations come primarily from José Martí, the Apostle of Cuban independence, and from the New Testament, rather than from Lenin or Stalin. The new schoolbooks, a useful gauge of the political complexion of the regime, preach Cuban patriotism, without a word about Marx or Moscow.

In recent months, it is true, the PSP has steadily increased its membership and prestige, and it is looked upon with favor by the regime. PSP president Juan Marinello, an old Stalinist, sometimes sits on the dais with the Cabinet at official government rallies, and has been allowed to address Army units and speak on TV. *Hoy*, the PSP newspaper, which is dull and has a small circulation, has been allowed to use government-owned presses and has been allotted a newsprint quota. Blas Roca, another top PSP official, has been travelling around China and Eastern Europe on a Cuban diplomatic passport. The PSP is cooperating as actively as it can with Castro, and has a certain amount of influence at lower administrative levels. But to assert that it dominates the Cuban government would be false. Tad Szulc in *The New York Times* (August 3) states the case with commendable accuracy: "Communism has achieved its success in Cuba because it identified itself with the social revolution rather than expecting the revolution to become identified with it. [The PSP] has made no effort to preach Communist doctrines among Cubans, preferring to gain quiet acceptance and respectability while moving its members and sympathizers into important positions." The PSP, which now claims 25,000 members, is growing in numbers, and has a limited influence in the universities, the labor movement, and in some government departments. Whether it will go on to seize the leadership of the Cuban revolution, or decline in the face of reform presided over by others will depend to a disconcerting extent upon the sophistication of US policy toward Cuba during the next months and years.

Why the Anti-Americanism?

The Castro regime's anti-Americanism can certainly be explained without resorting to such allegations as that made by our government on August 22, 1960, charging Cuba with "establishing a training program for Communist agents and guerrillas to spread the Communist revolution throughout Latin America." Our history books still slight the Cuban struggle for independence during the latter part of the 19th Century, and give the comic opera performance of Theodore Roosevelt and his Rough Riders an exaggerated share of the credit for victory in the war against Spain. (The US lost a few hundred men in the battles around Santiago; between 1895 and 1898 hundreds of thousands of Cubans died in battle or of hunger and disease). Cubans resent the long (1902-1934) and humiliating tutelage imposed on them under the Platt Amendment; for an additional quarter of a century they continued to be victims of American economic exploitation. As long as a Cuban government paid its debts, kept the peso at par, and kow-towed to American investors, the US did not care how corrupt and vicious it was toward its own people. Castro himself answers the charge of hostility with a *tu quoque* argument that has some logic and much emotional force: "When Cubans were being murdered in great numbers . . . when our streets were being stained with the blood of workers and youth . . . it never occurred to the powerful *Yanqui* oligarchy to tell the American tourists not to come to Havana . . . nor to have its press write of the horrors in which Cuba lived, or to cut the Cuban sugar quota."

The Eisenhower Administration, rightfully critical of Soviet tyranny in Eastern Europe, nevertheless tolerated murder in Cuba for nearly seven years, and even decorated some of those responsible. Under John Foster Dulles the State Department gave its backing to Batista, Trujillo, Pérez Jiménez, Perón, the Somoza family, Odría, Rojas Pinilla and Stroessner, every dictatorship in this hemisphere. When criticized for this policy by a group of Chilean students, President Eisenhower blandly told them that "surely no country loves liberty more" – and then went to visit Franco and Salazar on his European tour.

The new regime's requests for a $4 million loan for road building equipment, and a $1 million barter deal of Cuban chrome for corn to meet a food shortage were turned down. In February, 1959, a mission headed by Dr. Justo Carillo, then head of the Cuban Development Bank, was sent back empty-handed. When Fidel indicated that he would like to visit the United States

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no official invitation was forthcoming; when he came anyway, in response to an unofficial invitation, he got a frosty reception. The President, who found time to play golf and to circle the globe on "good will" tours, was too busy to spend a few minutes with Cuba's Premier in Washington. Christian Herter met Castro in a hotel room rather than at the State Department to emphasize the fact that he was not being received officially.

The State Department has never thought it necessary to apologize or make amends for training Batista troops which killed Cubans, and supplying his Air Force with weapons to attack Cuban cities. When small planes based in Florida made repeated raids on Cuban cities and canefields last year, the State Department was slow to admit the fact, slower still to apologize for it, and slowest of all to take measures against such flights; it was "impossible," a spokesman explained, to police such a large area. Even after Pedro Diaz Lanz, an ex-Major in the Cuban Air Force, publicly boasted that he had made such flights, nobody took action against him. (Federal authorities and the Florida State Police have now shown that it is, after all, "possible" to prevent such raids.) Miami is full of Batista officials conspiring against the Cuban government. Senator Smathers has suggested that we make his state an official and protected headquarters for an armed invasion of the island.

In May of this year General Francisco Tabernilla, Batista's Army commander, and Colonel Manuel Ugalde Carrillo, chief of the dictator's Military Intelligence Service (SIM), came to Washington to testify (at $35 a day plus expenses) about conditions in Cuba; a Senate committee listened gravely and with approval to their fairy tales about "a giant concrete strip hidden in a Cuban swamp," intended for use as a launching pad for Soviet rockets. Shortly afterwards the Administration cancelled its tiny technical assistance program in Cuba, and withdrew six agricultural specialists and three civil aviation advisers who were working on the island. Our government has even refused to permit the sale to Cuba of helicopters for crop-dusting, on the ground that Castro intends to use them for military purposes.

From Bad to Worse

The recent rapid deterioration of relations between the two countries began this June, after the arrival of the first shipments of Soviet crude oil in Havana. The USSR, which seems to have plenty of oil available for export (it is selling to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, as well as to Cuba), got its sugar at the rock-bottom price of 3 cents a pound, and will sell it inside Russia at a fat profit. Cuba, in return, disposed of surplus sugar that it could not sell to the US or in the world market, and protected her dwindling supply of dollars. Standard, Texaco, and Shell had been charging their Cuban subsidiaries $2.90 a barrel for Venezuelan crude, and had run up $60 million in unpaid balances at Ché Guevara's National Bank; Soviet oil was made available to Cuba at $2.10 a barrel and could be paid for with sugar. Castro planned to satisfy one-fourth of Cuba's oil requirements in this way.

The oil companies had repeated warnings of the regime's intentions. They refused to process Soviet crude in their refineries for several reasons. The companies have been having trouble keeping the price structure firm in the face of the current world oversupply of crude, and from a business point of view thought it foolish to let their facilities be used to assist a dangerous competitor; the profits in the industry have always been in the producing end, rather than in refining. They had been unable for some time, moreover, to get dollars for the pesos they earned inside Cuba, and it was already quite apparent that no American company was going to make any profit in the island as long as the present situation lasted. They decided to pull out and cut their losses, and had already sent many of their American workers home when Fidel, as expected, moved in and took over.

President Eisenhower then acted. Two of his aides appeared on Capitol Hill, where Congress had been dawdling over the sugar quota bill for six months, and announced that the President was "furious" over the delay, and that he would call Congress back into special session unless he was given the power to deal with Cuba. Republican congressmen jumped into action with charges that the Democratic majorities in both houses were "taking a pro-Castro position," and "giving a bonus for Communism." In a tumultous all-night session Congress jammed through a sugar bill without a single dissenting vote. The President wasted no time in completely eliminating Cuba from the American market for the rest of the year.

This hasty action, in which both Congress and the President, Democrats and Republicans all joined, was a blunder which gave Cuba a giant shove toward the Soviet bloc. Castro, already angry, saw all his suspicions confirmed – the *Yanquis* were out to bring him to his knees. (In the same month Joe Louis was pressured by the State Department to give up a $287,000 public relations contract with Cuba, and the franchise of the Sugar Kings, Havana's International League Baseball team, was taken away to Jersey City.) In his next TV appearance the Premier was more defiant than ever: "For every pound they take from the quota, we will take a sugar mill. . . . We will take and take until not even the nails of their shoes are left." After a suitable period of preparation, he carried out his threat; on August 7, the $300 million Cuban Electric Company, the $100 million Cuban Telephone Company, and the

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Standard, Texaco, and Sinclair refineries were nationalized, under terms that make it doubtful that they will ever be paid a penny for their property. (They are to be compensated with 50-year 2 percent bonds, payable out of sugar sales to the US above a certain amount and price.)

Moscow exulted and Latin America cheered the humbling of the Yankee Goliath. The USSR and Communist China had already bought up every available pound of Cuban sugar (though at prices about 2 cents less than the US had been paying), and tankers from the Soviet bloc rushed emergency shipments to Havana. Despite predictions of imminent collapse, the refineries and utilities are working quite normally.

I realize that this is not the story being told in many US newspapers and magazines. Miss Dorothy Kilgallen, for example, prides herself on being the first to inform her readers that Castro was a tool of the Kremlin. But let us check the accuracy of some of her early columns:

"Washington insiders expect Fidel Castro to be invited to the White House, on the advice of diplomats working on the old theory that if we don't make him love us, he may be wooed by the Russians." [January 21, 1959] (Comment: That diplomatic advice was not bad, but Castro never got to the White House.)

"Havana's famed gambling casinos will get permission to resume full scale operations within two weeks. The same people who got the green light from Batista managed to reach Castro." [January 29, 1959] (Comment: Meyer and Jake Lansky, Santo Trafficante, and other top US gamblers were thrown out of Cuba as soon as Castro came to power. The casinos are now run by the Cuban government, and Americans are not even allowed to serve as croupiers.)

"There have been three minor revolutions within the Castro forces in the brief period of time since the rebel leader took over Cuba. If Fidel doesn't call in some brainy experts to help him run the country and keep him from making boo-boos, he'll be out within the year." [February 2, 1959] (Comment: There were defections, but no revolution. No "experts" have been called in, and Fidel is still in power.)

"Gambler Frank Erickson returned to Havana last week, sure sign that for all his lofty talk, Fidel Castro wants 'the boys' back running the casinos." [February 6, 1959] (Comment: Not a word of truth in this.)

"When Fidel Castro isn't engaged in giving out interviews for television variety shows in the US, he's busy restraining hot-headed brother Raúl from staging mass executions in the Cuban provinces." [March 2, 1959] (Comment: About 700 Batista officials were executed after trials, with a review of their cases by a second court. Had speedy trials not taken place these men would have been torn to pieces in the streets, as Machado's *porristas* (bludgeoners) were in 1933. There have been no political executions and only a handful of executions of any kind this year.)

"Our government's intelligence reports on Cuba's Fidel Castro go back to the 1940's and aren't very pretty. They list him as a Communist and a killer." [April 6, 1959] (Comment: She heard this from somebody unreliable, or made it up. See General Cabell's testimony quoted above.)

"US intelligence is virtually non-existent if the government isn't aware that Russia already has bases in Cuba, and Russian pilots in uniform are strutting openly in Havana . . . [Fidel] has machine guns and other ammunition mounted on every key rooftop near his base of operations, but the smart money doubts if any amount of precaution can change his status as a clay pigeon." [July 15, 1959] (Comment: Miss Kilgallen has not visited Cuba for a number of years. There are no Soviet bases of any kind in Cuba, no Russian pilots strutting around Havana in uniform – as if the Kremlin would advertise them openly if they were being sent! Fidel is notoriously careless about his personal safety, and does not even have a bodyguard.)

Loose Phrases

It is perhaps unfair, and in the case of Miss Kilgallen not a little ungallant, to expect accurate reporting on the Cuban situation from people more at home in New York night clubs. But millions of people form their opinions of what is happening in the world from just such muddy springs of information. Moreover, event the most respectable journalists and news magazines have been saying much the same things. Here, for example, are excerpts from an article by former Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle, printed in *The Reporter*, July 7, 1960: "For all practical purposes Cuba is just as much a Communist satellite as Hungary or North Korea. I mean that a few Communists, or men controlled by them, whose policy and tactics are directed either by Moscow or Peking (probably the latter, though at the moment it is not certain) are in control of Cuba's resources, its territory, and its voiceless people. . . . The island republic has been converted into not only a spearhead of Soviet and Chinese propaganda but also a potential base for Soviet and Chinese power.

"The clique dominating Cuba intends direct aggression against the rest of Latin America with Chinese and Soviet support. . . . It is said that about $150 million has been spent for [arms]. . . . Furthermore, it is possible that Castro's trade agreements with the Soviet Union involved arms packages from the Skoda works in Czechoslovakia, though the Czech government recently went out of its way to deny that report. . . . It has been reported that construction work is going forward under heavy secrecy. . . .

"Reports multiply that Cuba will enter the Soviet orbit by joining the Warsaw Pact or by ceding a Cuban

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military base, air or naval, to the Soviet Union. The base would be useful for the Russian Badger planes which now can fly over the United States but cannot return. These reports have not been denied. . . . Meanwhile Castro and his group rant that all must join in defense of Cuba against invasion by the United States. Have we forgotten that Soviet troops were sent to Hungary on the pretext that they must fight American armies on the banks of the Danube? What should the United States do? The answer, I think, is fairly plain . . . The United States and any Latin-American countries that care to join (I believe most would do so) should be prepared to oppose by all necessary means any movements or governments that are manipulated overtly or covertly by forces outside the hemisphere. This is not a breach of the nonintervention principle . . . What I am suggesting is not intervention but defense."

I mean no disrespect to Mr. Berle or to *The Reporter* when I point out that the above extracts have some self-evident errors. What kind of a Communist satellite is it, for example, that has a $75 million US naval base located within its borders, and a multi-million dollar campaign designed to attract US tourists? Communist satellites maintain a close watch over their frontiers and a strict surveillance over foreigners; I went to Cuba without a passport (none is required for US citizens), travelled all over the island freely, passed even inside military cantonments where I was courteously shown around by a polite captain in the Rebel Army, and engaged in long and heated political discussions with dozens of people on the steps of the Capitol of downtown Havana.

Mr. Berle's statement that Peking is "probably" in control of the Cuban government is made without any factual support; none of *The New York Times* correspondents on the spot have made this contention. Cuba is a "potential base" of the USSR in the same sense, I suppose, that Yugoslavia is a "potential base" of the US, but in neither case are weapons in place yet.

Notice the looseness of Mr. Berle's phrase about the Skoda works: "it is possible" (*anything* is possible) that arms are to be sent, and the fact that the Czech government "went out of its way" to deny the report makes the charge even more likely. It may be, of course, that Skoda arms *are* being sent; I cannot say they have not, but neither should we assume that this is the case.

Mr. Berle goes on to make the Khrushchev visit to Cuba sound sinister; apparently only Eisenhower is allowed to invite Russians to visit his country. (When I asked the INRA publicity director why he thought K. was coming to Cuba, he smiled and said, proudly, if ingenuously, "Why, he's coming here to see all the wonderful things we are doing here, and to see what he can learn from us." The story about the Badger planes is original with Mr. Berle, but again somewhat speculative, to say the least. As the USSR has rockets that can hit the moon, how likely it is that they would wish to imperil their chances to win over Latin America by trade, aid and propaganda for the sake of a few highly vulnerable bases in Cuba?

After reminding us once more of Hungary (a staple item in USIS propaganda and one which I discovered has begun to bore Latin Americans), Mr. Berle comes out with a proposal that clearly implies outright aggression against Cuba. The hope that Latin American countries would join the *Yanqui* State Department in a military adventure in the Caribbean is absurd, as the recent uproar over the sugar quota showed. The phrase "all necessary means," if it means anything, signifies a return to the days of the Platt Amendment: to paraphrase Mr. Berle, sending the Marines to Cuba on the pretext that they must fight Soviet troops in the Sierra Maestra. And, finally, there is the assertion that intervention would not be "a breach of the nonintervention principle." I don't pretend to understand the semantics of that.

Khrushchev rattled his rockets in response to our implied threat to invade Cuba; both Castro and Khrushchev have repeatedly denied any intention of setting up Soviet bases on the island. It is, furthermore, nonsense to believe that such bases could be set up secretly. Modern rocket emplacements require enormous amounts of equipment, fuel, technicians, concrete pads, buildings, etc., all of which would have to be sent by sea, under the eye of the US Navy and Air Force, and put in place on an island the size of Pennsylvania and only half an hour from the US by a very slow plane.

More of the Same

It seems most probable to me that unless we make any more mistakes in our Cuban policy, Castro will continue on his same course. He will remain hostile to the US, no matter what we do, for a long time to come. He will very probably take over the remaining $400 million in US property on the island as soon as his men have digested the plants they have already swallowed. He will continue his shrill propaganda campaign against "Yankee Imperialism." Having just freed his country from one master, however, he is not anxious to subject her to another by inviting Soviet occupation of the island. Such a step, moreover, would destroy much of the prestige he still has throughout Latin America, cause internal convulsions of a serious kind, and almost surely invite US intervention. Fidel, Raúl, Guevara and Major Núñez have repeatedly stated that they have no intention even of asking the US to evacuate Guantanamo, which they pooh-pooh as obsolete and useless in the age of ballistic missiles. The base brings in about $8 million a year in scarce dollars

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(in the form of wage payments to Cubans employed there), and is a splendid propaganda item. I believe the *barbudos* would be genuinely shocked and disappointed if we did pack up and leave.

Assuming, then, that Castro's Cuba follows a leftist-nationalist-neutralist line, basically similar to the positions adopted by Nasser's Egypt and Tito's Yugoslavia – get all you can from the Big Powers, and give them as little as possible in return – it will be vitally important for our next President to adopt a sensible policy in dealing with this infuriatingly sovereign little island. "We are," Nuñez has explained, "like a little bone stuck in your throat. You can't swallow us, but you can't spit us out, either." American diplomacy, accustomed to having its own way in Cuba (Ambassadors Gardner and Smith used to make Cuban officials call on them, instead of observing the diplomatic niceties) will have to adjust itself to acting with unaccustomed caution, and tact, and patience. We are now forced to deal on terms of real juridical equality – and the sooner we stop dreaming about the good old days, the better.

Given Cuba's current dependence on the USSR – without those Soviet oil tankers tied up in Havana Bay the economy would collapse in a week – our worry about Soviet subversion is legitimate. But we will not exorcise the Red menace by the clumsy economic weapons we have been using so far in our cold war against Cuba. The quota cut, and the economic boycott the oil companies and the State Department are trying to organize only injure and infuriate Castro without being effective enough to bring him down.

Our diplomatic efforts at the recent OAS meeting in Costa Rica have not been very successful either. Latin Americans applauded our break with Trujillo's dictatorship, but were well aware that they had Castro to thank for this reversal of a 30-year old policy. Much of its effect was lost when Senator Ellender's remark that he "wished there were a Trujillo in every country in South and Central America" made the front pages from Mexico City to Buenos Aires. Latin Americans are also understandably dubious about the Administration's sudden change of heart about economic aid. The $600 million program vaguely outlined by the President this July is widely referred to as "The Castro plan," and the exclusion of Cuba from its promised benefits makes the scheme appear like a shameful kind of bribe. In the end, Secretary Herter got only a paper condemnation of Sino-Soviet interference in the Western hemisphere that will be useful chiefly in taking the heat off the Administration until after the election, but Ignacio Luis Arcaya, Venezuela's foreign minister, expressed a common and growing sentiment when he warned against attempting "to limit democratic liberties under the pretext of fighting Communism." Even after the final declaration was watered down, Acaya and Peru's Raúl Porras refused to sign it and Mexico issued a clarifying statement weakening it still further. The Cubans remained more truculent than ever.

If economic sanctions and diplomatic maneuvers will not work, neither will military force. After taking the position we did on Suez and Hungary, the US can hardly afford to commit aggression against a small neighboring nation. Cubans have been talking in Churchillian terms about defending their island to the last cane field, and they are quite prepared to turn Cuba into another Algeria.

We must learn, then, to live with Castro, just as Britain has learned to live with Nasser, and Khrushchev has had to get along with Tito. And Castro, for all his invective, will have to learn to live with the United States. Both countries are going to suffer if Cuban sugar is shipped to Peking in exchange for Chinese machinery, instead of to New York in exchange for American goods. Any arrangement that tries to break this natural interchange is foolish. As Brazil's Kubitschek said recently, in a phrase that is doubtless as wounding to Castro's sensibilities as to our own, "It is time for both Cuba and the United States to act the part of grown men." We have not been playing an heroic role in our quarrel with a nation whose annual income of $2.8 billion is about equal to what we spend on cosmetics each year.

If we can manage to surmount the present crisis, our long-run possibilities of doing business with the new Cuba are not as hopeless as they now appear. If we can escape from the futile tit-for-tat of economic retaliation and provocative gestures that anger but do not vitally damage Cuba, we can hope to supply a substantial part of the increased Cuban demand for farm machinery, automotive equipment, canning factories, fishing boats, bulldozers, turbines, and the dazzling assortment of American consumer goods, too. As Mr. Eisenhower said shortly after cutting down our sugar imports from Cuba: "The mere fact that someone that might believe in a different form of government than I do and establish it themselves freely, then I don't see how the United States could properly object or intervene." Our proximity to the island gives us a considerable advantage over Soviet competitors. When the promised factories from China arrive, for example, they will have paid a heavy freight bill, and getting replacement parts for them in a hurry will be out of the question. (Our agricultural attache in Havana told me that the spare parts problem has already begun to disenchant cooperative managers with the new Soviet tractors that are now arriving). Cuba is apparently entering a stage of rapid economic growth, during which the effective demand for both capital and consumer goods will rise quickly. A policy of restraint and patience, of keeping the lines of diplomatic and commercial communication open, will give us the opportunity to win back Cuban markets and friendship.

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Again, the Bitter Fountain

by Irving Howe

When Ignazio Silone, ending a long and painful exile, returned to Italy after the Second World War, he found himself in a troubling situation. He had been honored in Europe and America as a writer who had measured the human damage done by Fascism, yet his work was little known to his countrymen. He had led a life of exemplary resistance to Mussolini's dictatorship, yet his very independence, now prompting him to an unpopular struggle against the Italian Communists, made the younger intellectuals feel uneasy or even hostile toward him. In the eyes of many European and American readers he seemed to be a spokesman for a radical integrity, a personal humaneness which had its sources in, but clearly transcended, the politics of socialism; yet for the Italians, even when they accorded him gestures of homage, he was a hard man to accept.

Fontamara
by Ignazio Silone
translated by Harvey Fergusson II
with a foreword by Malcolm Cowley
(Atheneum; $4)

Alas, men of exemplary stature are often hard to accept; returned exiles stir feelings of guilt and irritation. And even when, like Silone, they are quite free from pretensions to moral superiority or mannerisms of bravado, they must seem a silent rebuke to those who have been less heroic or more cautious.

But Silone is a man of gloomy and sardonic humor, who has suffered so much in his own life and absorbed so fully the terribleness of this century that the shakiness of his reputation in Italy, though it must surely have hurt him, did not long keep him from his proper work. That work, as he tells us in the preface to the new version of his first novel, *Fontamara*, was simply to keep retelling, in book after book, his one inevitable story: the story of a man who will not make his peace and thereby, at the very extreme of his helplessness, comes to seem an example of the human. Silone kept retelling this story to himself, almost as if to assure himself that it was still possible, and to his friends, those readers who form an invisible community sharing with him a common background and outlook and wanting also to hear that the story is still possible.

Now, shortly after the war, *Fontamara* was to have its first printing in Italy. This bitter and sadly humorous tale about the sufferings of the Abruzzi peasants during the Mussolini era had been written in 1930 when, as Silone recalls, "it did not appear that I had long to live," so ill and disconsolate was he at the time. Composed, as he tells us, "with unspeakable affliction and anxiety," the book was to serve as a political fable, a paradigm of the radical expectation that peasant and worker, meeting and uniting, could together fulfill a common destiny. By 1930 Silone was no longer a Communist, but he was still a revolutionary, and his book breathes a fire of desperate hope, a firm militancy which makes it very much a part of its historical moment.

By the mid-forties, when Silone took up his novel once more, he found that he wished to change it, not because there was so great a contrast between "my book and the natural reality which I had before my eyes" but because "the story of 1930" had continued to develop "in me . . . during all those years in which I had continued to live in it." Somewhat like Faulkner, Silone has always been one of those writers who, in retelling one essential story, make the locale of their imagination into a permanent home.

Because he now saw Fontamara, the village of the "bitter fountain," in a new way, Silone decided to rewrite *Fontamara*. It was a dangerous decision, since few things can be more damaging to a writer's early work than a return with the disenchantments of hindsight. But Silone has met this problem with characteristic modesty. The new version of *Fontamara* does not strike me as a significant improvement over the earlier one, but neither is it a violation; the changes are interesting, but not as sharp or melodramatic as American reviewers have claimed.

In the new version, as Malcolm Cowley notes in his foreword, Silone has dropped some of the anecdotal and humorous by-play of the original. Though not essential to the plot, this material added flavor and liveliness, especially since the anecdote is Silone's most congenial form. The loss is regrettable but hardly serious. A more important change is that Berardo, the peasant hero of the novel who goes to Rome and there meets the leader of the political underground, is now brought more sharply into the foreground and his irascible consciousness is more carefully developed. Yet this in itself does not constitute evidence – nor do I find any other – for Cowley's statement, which has been repeated by many reviewers, that the Fontamara "community recedes into the background." It is true that Berardo emerges more clearly, but he can exist only by token of his place in the village; he has not become anything at all like the isolated hero of a Camus novel, he remains a dominant figure in the kind of "collec-

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tive" novel that *Fontamara* was and still is. And the peasant village is still, in this new version, the very heart and marrow of the story.

I stress this point because it relates to a more important one. It has become a cliché in writing about Silone to say that he has moved from political to moral concerns, and Cowley adorns it by adding some references to Christian myth. Now this is true enough – but not in the way American intellectuals and literary men like to suppose. For a European like Silone the counterposition of politics and morality, taken in the simple absolute sense that American critics tend to favor, is almost inconceivable. His whole intellectual journey has been devoted to finding ways of bringing together politics and morality; like most intelligent Europeans, he simply cannot accept the duality between public and private, political and moral, active and contemplative which has become so dominant among us in the last few decades. His mind is too supple, too dialectical, too humane for such formulas.

The new version of *Fontamara* – and here we do reach a major change – ends on a more quizzical and uncertain note than the first one; the need for action is still asserted, but action itself is now seen not as an unambiguous positive, it has become a problem, still another in the burdened life of the peasants. The echo of Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?" which rose like an angry fist at the end of the American translation of the original *Fontamara* has now been muted in Mr. Fergusson's excellent translation of the new version; and there is, he tells me, adequate basis for this in the original Italian. But lest too much be made of this change, Mr. Fergusson points out, in a letter he has been kind enough to send me, that a translation of the first version which appeared in England in 1934 also failed to echo Lenin's phrase. At the end of Mr. Fergusson's translation, the peasants now ask not "What Is To Be Done?" but "What Can We Do?" The change is a poignant one, it reflects Silone's deepening of mind and heart, it is more a question than an exclamation – indeed, it is almost anything you might want except a turn from politics to morality.

The book itself, I might add, continues to be a beautiful and affecting work, full of the passion of our age, full of its sadness and defeat and, perhaps, its redemptive possibility. It comes at a particularly happy moment for those of us who admire the author. Silone has now reached his 60th birthday, and the appearance of this book will for many readers recall memories of a career matchless in its integrity. Fontamara was a village with a "bitter fountain," but the waters that flowed from *Fontamara* were – it is not too soon to testify – life-giving.

The Chinese Intellectuals Unleashed

by Calvin Smith

The "Hundred Flowers Campaign" was launched on a limited front in spring 1956, when the Chinese leaders made their first organized effort to gain cooperation from the Western-trained or Western-oriented Chinese intellectuals in the fulfilment of their plans for "Socialist construction." The intellectuals, at a time of "Socialist high tide" – the final abolition of private industry and a rush towards agricultural collectivization – were offered no more than rather better working conditions and the opportunity to use material other than Russian in origin. In return, their whole-hearted backing was required for the regime's policies. Their response was very cautious – understandably enough, since whatever Mao's intentions the petty bosses preserved their bureaucratic routines.

The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Chinese Intellectuals,
by Roderick MacFarquhar
with an epilogue by G. F. Hudson
(Praeger; $6.75)

As the minor "Leap Forward" of 1956 bogged down, and under the shadow of events in Hungary, Mao began to raise his offers to the intellectuals – including the members of the "Democratic" parties, that led a ghostlike exist-

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ence alongside the Communists. The Communist Party, in Mao's thinking, had to mend its ways and get closer to the "masses" ("Recitification of Working Style" was the appropriate jargon). The "Democratic" parties were encouraged and finally stimulated to help the Communists by offering criticism.

This was a monumental miscalculation on Mao's side – perhaps a heroic one on the other. Mao presumably thought that the basic "socialist" training of the "Democrats," academics and students would preserve them from uttering any too-gross heresies. The critics, after so much urging, thought that they were guaranteed against reprisal, or (in the case of the students) simply let off steam. They uttered devastating criticisms not only of the Party's working style but also of the foundations of Communist rule. In June the heat was turned on to them by the Communists. In the universities there was a campaign of rigid repression. By the New Year, the Communists had evoked a new line which involved leaving the old intellectuals in limbo and training of a new "Red and Expert" generation.

Such briefly is the story. The central episode is the subject of Mr. MacFarquhar's book. It is a valuable book in that it consists mainly of original documents – criticisms uttered in May by the "Democratic" parties and conscientiously reported by the Communist press, stories told against them by the Communists in the period of counter attack, and subsequent confessions. Some of the material has been translated for this book, and is not available elsewhere. However, the "100 Flowers" episode is not treated as a whole. The campaign was launched in April 1956; the book, which lays principal – almost exclusive – emphasis on the period from May to June of 1957, is mistitled; in spite of Mr. MarcFarquhar's admirable notes there is too much emphasis on what was only the climax to a long development.

Mr. MacFarquhar's object is of course not to describe the campaign as a whole, but to present China with the lid off as seen through the critics' eyes. Again, however, the criticism of May and June is treated too much apart from its general and especially its economic context. The reader would not, for instance, gather from it any hint of the severe criticisms launched by the Party leaders against their own cadres at the Eighth National Party Congress in 1956.

The picture thus lacks depth. And the composition is, I find, irritating. The general arrangement of extracts is by classes of author (scholars, journalists, etc.) rather than by subjects of criticism. This has certain advantages; one knows where to look for remarks, *e.g.*, on Communist film-studio management or newspaper office routine. The trouble is that so many types of professional critic uttered the same general and non-professional criticisms. There is thus, under the author's scheme, much needless repetition. However, there is no simple way for an editor of such material, and the reader has many easily accessible nuggets to be thankful for. A critic must be allowed one complaint about the selection of an anthology. I regret personally that there is only a curtailed version of one of the most trenchant criticisms uttered, in which a Chinese (who, incidentally, did not lose his job) curtly listed four faults of the regime – megalomania, speed mania, passionate hate of the old, passionate love of the new.

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

*"It's Jane Austen's version of The Affluent Society"**

Margaret Halsey's new book, just published, is being greeted with huzzahs by connoisseurs of the sparkling word and the rational view. Here are the first tributes:

* **MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE:** "I read it through at a gulp. It is very diverting and equable with delightful undertones of irony throughout. And so well written! I decided it was Jane Austen's version of *The Affluent Society*, in some ways even more perceptive than Professor Galbraith's careful analysis. Not 'Sense and Sensibility' but 'Affluence and Affability.' I did enjoy it enormously."

HARVEY SWADOS: "It is more than funny – it is very cheering. I for one was very happy to have the suspicion confirmed that suburbia has not crushed the brains or the spirit out of American womanhood."

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MARGARET HALSEY'S
This Demi-Paradise
$3.50. Simon and Schuster

"O, for a Draught..."

With the help of an underground acquaintance named Charon, I managed this summer to get my hands on a two gallon jug of lethe water – a brew which, when generously laced with nepenthe, is absolutely invaluable in helping you to forget your more harrowing experiences. This infernal cocktail worked so well for me that I was able to blot out not only the horrors of the last Broadway season, but some of the atrocities of the early summer as well. I remember going in July to see Jackson MacLow's *Marrying Maiden* and Sophocles' *Women of Trachis* at The Living Theater. But aside from a few details (I recollect that the first featured dialogue selected at random by a throw of the dice, drowned out anyway by cacophonous sounds on unidentifiable instruments, and that the second was translated by Ezra Pound into colloquialisms which would have seemed dated during the war of 1812), my memory of them is a merciful blank. I think I went to Stratford, too, for I recall watching Katherine Hepburn, in what was advertised as a production of *Twelfth Night*, impersonate Captain Horatio Hornblower in a setting laid in Brighton by the Sea. Remembering that previous Stratford performances had been placed in Spanish Texas and 19th-Century Vienna, I conveniently forgot to see Robert Ryan support Miss Hepburn in *Antony and Cleopatra*. I admit to a little irresponsibility there, but I expect to catch the movie version which, no doubt, will be laid in a cigar factory near Rome, Ga.

New York Shakespeare Festival:
Henry V
Measure for Measure
The Taming of the Shrew
(Central Park)

After a few visits to the (free) New York Shakespeare Festival in Central Park, however, I am now petitioning Mnemosyne, goddess of memory, for an antidote – never have I so bitterly regretted the impermanence of the theatrical occasion. Through love, intelligence, imagination, and sheer doggedness, Joseph Papp has built this company into an ensemble comparable to any in the world, a group so virile that it makes the Old Vic look like a collection of Bennington girls doing their junior year field work. The company, has, thank heaven, developed no stars, so the first production was somewhat hampered by a certain monotony in the leading role; but this *Henry V*, directed by Papp himself, was so muscular, masculine, and leathery that, in retrospect, I began to think Olivier's film version (which always seemed to me definitive) a little soft and sentimental. To name only one of the insights of this strong interpretation, the wooing scene became, in Papp's conception, less a piece of romantic badinage than a practical act of policy, less a love contest between a skilled suitor and a coy, yielding kitten than a political contract between a clumsy, ambitious, good natured king and an ironic, occasionally bitchy princess who will not easily forget how many of her kinsmen were killed on the battlefield.

The Festival production of *Measure for Measure* was less impressive – not so much a miscarriage as something which was never conceived. The director, Alan Schneider, hadn't much idea about how to solve the problems of the play, and he didn't know how to use Eldon Elder's handsome and functional setting. As for the acting, the supporting company was quite good, especially in the lowlife scenes, but for the leads Schneider imported an Antonio who expended too much energy impersonating Gielgud, and an Isabella still too green and sanguine to capture the sudden shifts of this difficult creature – together, they capsized the show into a little pond of tedium.

The third production, a spirited performance of *Taming of the Shrew*, was the season's triumph, and a triumph for the American theater. Though superlatives have a habit of sticking in my throat, I must not temporize here:

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